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ABSTRACT 
Accountability by state owned companies has been lacking in recent times. The 
need for an oversight mechanism to improve governance and as such accountability 
is required for state owned companies (IOD and PWC, 2011). Integrated reporting 
has answered this call due to its ability to provide a holistic view of the factors that 
create value for an entity in the short, medium and long-term. South African state 
owned companies have realised the benefit integrated reporting can have on their 
corporate governance and as such  have adopted integrated reporting in terms of 
King III and the IR Framework. The purpose of this study is to investigate the trends 
in integrated reporting by state owned companies per The Public Finance 
Management Act 1999 for the 2013, 2014 and 2015 financial periods. This report 
examines the extent of disclosure made by state owned companies per the King III 
and IR Framework recommendations and requirements in respect of integrated 
reporting; by means of using a scorecard approach to identify the level of disclosure 
made by each state owned company. The key findings of this study was that the 
level of reporting disclosure by state owned companies increased  following an 
upward positive trend with the disclosures on average increasing from providing little 
information on a poor to average basis in 2013 to providing some information at a 
satisfactory level in 2015. It was found that there were no instances of non-
compliance with overall disclosure by any of the state owned companies analysed 
over the three year period.  Furthermore, not a single company provided disclosure 
overall at an excellent level in any of the three years analysed. This finding suggests 
that although improving, the level of integrated reporting disclosure by state owned 
companies is still only satisfactory and as such there is a lot of room for improvement 
over time. Areas that are in need of reform relate to governance, the governance of 
information technology, the provision of information on the outlook of the entity and 
information as to the basis upon which integrated reports are prepared. 
Keywords: Accountability; corporate governance; corporate reporting; Integrated 
reporting; International Integrated Reporting Framework; King III; non-financial 
information;  state owned entities   
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION TO STUDY 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
In the last 40 years, there has been a gradual advancement in social, environmental 
and ethical reporting (Solomon and Maroun, 2012). In more recent times, the 
integration of social, environmental and ethical reporting together with an entity’s 
annual report, to create one report called an integrated report has become the focus 
of reporting (Solomon and Maroun, 2012). The purpose of this research study is to 
evaluate the trends in integrated reporting by South African state owned companies 
as defined in the Public Finance Management Act 1999 (PFMA). This has been 
carried out by evaluating the extent of compliance with the recommendations of the 
King Report and Code of Governance Principles for South Africa 2009 (King III) and 
the International Integrated Reporting Framework (IR Framework) by state owned 
companies over the 2013, 2014 and 2015 financial years. 
Makiwane (2012) evaluated the differences in reporting by Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange (JSE) listed companies, given the change over from King II to King III 
which became effective as of 1 March 2010. Makiwane (2012) conducted this 
evaluation by comparing the reporting of JSE listed companies from 2009 to 
2010/2011. Makiwane (2012) recommended that a greater deal needs to be done in 
order to improve the level of reporting of JSE listed companies listed in order for the 
objective of integrated reporting to be met.  
This study draws on research conducted by Makiwane (2012) however, the context 
of the study will relate to the evaluation of state owned companies. The aim of this 
research is to allow for insight into the trends in integrated reporting from a state 
owned company perspective which is the first of its kind.  
1.2 Context of the study 
This study focuses only on South African state owned entities per the PFMA and the 
reporting requirements that apply to them. The Companies Act No.71 of 2008 
(Companies Act), applies to companies defined as either profit or non-profit 
companies. State owned companies in South Africa are defined in The Companies 
Act as profit companies and as such must comply with the provisions of The 
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Companies Act. The objective of the PFMA “is to secure transparency, accountability 
and sound management of the revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of 
institutions to which this Act applies to” (Public Finance Management Act,1999:7). 
State owned companies must comply with the PFMA as they are listed as a public 
entity to which the PFMA applies. The context of the Acts covered in this research 
will thus be South African legislation. Although it is not a legislative requirement, the 
application of the principles and guidance of King III by state owned companies are 
desirable (PWC, 2012). This will lead to the spirit and all-encompassing governance 
principles of accountability, fairness, transparency and responsibility to be met 
effectively (PWC, 2012). 
King III is the primary source of information that deals with governance and 
integrated reporting in South Africa (IOD, 2009). The principle and code in respect of 
King III can be applied to all entities including state owned entities (IOD, 2009). In 
South Africa, many state owned companies have adopted integrated reporting per 
the code and governance principles of King III (KPMG, 2012). The application of 
integrated reporting by state owned companies will be evaluated based on The King 
Code of Governance Principles 2009. The International Reporting Council’s (IIRC) 
framework for integrated reporting and The International Integrated reporting 
Framework 2013 will also be considered in the evaluation of state owned companies 
integrated reports in this study given their current relevance and adoption by state 
owned companies of this framework (Nkonki, 2014) . 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of this literature review were to provide an in-depth analysis: 
 To identify the trends in integrated reporting by state owned companies 
though the adoption of King III and IR Framework. 
 To assess if adoption of King III and IR Framework, has assisted state owned 
companies in improving their integrated reporting disclosure and as a result 
their accountability to their various stakeholders. 
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1.4 Research question 
What are the trends in integrated reporting by South African state owned companies 
over the 2013, 2014 and 2015 financial years? 
1.5 Problem Statement 
The IOD and PWC (2011) report shows that there is a lack of accountability in state 
owned companies. Hence, integrated reporting may counter act the lack of 
accountability currently experienced by state owned companies (KPMG, 2012). State 
owned companies have realised the niche for the adoption of integrated reporting 
(KPMG, 2012). Therefore, this study has evaluated the trends in integrated reporting 
by South African state owned companies over the 2013, 2014 and 2015 financial 
years. 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
The importance of state owned companies in Africa has been debatable for decades 
(Adjasi and Mbo, 2013). More recently though the importance of state owned 
companies, particularly in developing economies has grown (Florio, 2014). State 
owned companies are an enduring feature to any economy PWC, 2015). As a result 
it is important to determine whether the operations carried out by state owned 
companies meet their societal outcomes (PWC, 2015). Moreover, the performance 
of state owned companies is an issue of concern (Adjasi and Mbo, 2013). 
Governance issues such as pitiable stakeholder engagement, deficiency in 
professionalism and minimal levels of transparency are to blame for the poor 
performance of many state owned companies (World Bank, 2007). These issues 
point to the need to improve governance in state owned companies given that they 
have trailed the private sector in terms of improvement in governance (IOD and 
PWC, 2011). 
The traditional reporting model which focuses on reporting historical financial 
information is lacking due to the focus on the past rather than the future (Owen, 
2013). On the other hand integrated reporting provides a multi-dimensional 
representation of an entity (Owen, 2013). A greater overview of the business 
operations which will create and sustain value as well as how challenges are 
managed both in the short-term and long-term by the entity are thus a benefit of 
integrated reporting (ACCA, 2011). By preparing and issuing integrated reports both 
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internally and externally, companies regardless whether they are privately owned or 
state owned, can  increase “the trust and confidence of its stakeholders and the 
legitimacy of its operations’’ (IOD, 2009:12). Furthermore, integrated reporting will 
allow state owned companies to “evaluate its ethics, fundamental values, and 
governance, and externally improve the trust and confidence which stakeholders 
have in it’’ (IOD, 2009:12). This is important to state owned companies given their 
lack of accountability (Luke, 2010). King III enables integrated reporting as well as 
recommends its application thus making it an appropriate guidance to be used to 
prepare integrated reports (IOD, 2009). 
Integrated reporting provides a framework for state owned companies to focus on 
reporting the principle objectives that they are required to meet and has been widely 
adopted by South African state owned entities (KPMG, 2012). This study is 
beneficial to determine the trends in integrated reporting by state owned companies 
due to the importance that state owned companies play in the economy and the 
issues that are prevalent in respect of their governance. 
1.7 Limitations of the study  
This study will be limited to the evaluation of state owned companies per the PFMA. 
The evaluation of the trends in integrated reporting will be limited to a three year 
period (2013,2014 and 2015) given that state owned companies have only more 
recently adopted King III as part of their reporting. The draft version of the King IV 
report was not considered in this study as it is not yet effective. 
1.8 Structure of the Report 
This research report consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research 
topic, provides a background to integrated reporting and highlights the significance of 
the study as well as provide an overview of the study.   
Chapter 2 reviews literature on the importance of state owned companies and how 
integrated reporting can assist state owned companies in improving stakeholder 
accountability. Furthermore, this chapter will discuss the King III and IR Framework 
and how these frameworks and guidance principles can assist state owned 
companies to prepare integrated reports that provide adequate disclosure on key 
matters.  
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Chapter 3 described the research methodology adopted in carrying out this research 
study.  Furthermore, it introduced the use of a scorecard as the research instrument.  
Lastly, chapter 3 sets out the procedure for data collection and data analysis 
required for the successful execution of this research study.  
Chapter 4 of this study discussed the findings from the integrated reports which were 
analysed and interpreted.  
Chapter 5, based on the results of the research, concluded by summarising the 
findings and recommended avenues for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2- LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Integrated reporting has gained attraction in recent times (Atkins and Maroun, 2012). 
Although integrated reporting is a relatively new concept through which entities report 
information globally, South Africa has led the way in implementing integrated reporting 
(Makiwane, 2012). The increasing focus by stakeholders on social, environmental and 
governance issues is the root source of the growth seen in integrated reports that are 
produced by entities (Adams and Simnett, 2011). This has changed and developed the 
way entities are held accountable and has developed a new form of accountability in light 
of the conditions prevalent at present (Hopwood, 1987). The use of retrospective financial 
information in the current economic environment does not satisfy the needs of 
shareholders and other stakeholders who seek information regarding the strategies and 
future objectives of an entity (Eurosif, 2009). Integrated Reports on the other hand provide 
a more comprehensive analysis of management’s realization of the value drivers of the 
entity and how they propose to leverage them going forward for shareholders and other 
stakeholders to understand (Adams and Simnett, 2011). Integrated reporting presents 
numerous advantages as information is aligned more accurately to investors needs’ with 
greater non-financial information becoming available which provides for better resource 
allocation by investors and stakeholders alike (Frias‐Aceituno, Rodríguez‐Ariza and 
Garcia‐Sánchez, 2014). 
 
2.2 Agency Theory 
The need for greater accountability by the board of directors and management to 
stakeholders of an entity following the global financial crisis has led to effective corporate 
governance within entities becoming a major focus area (IIRC, n.d). This need for 
accountability can be explained using agency theory. Agency theory can be summarised 
as a relationship between two parties comprising of an agent and a principle (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The agent acts on behalf of the principle and can make decisions on the 
principles behalf in respect of certain matters by virtue of the power given to the agent by 
the principle (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). An example of this would be 
a situation in which government as the shareholder in a state owned company acts in its 
capacity as the principle and entrusts the management of the state owned company to act 
as an agent and make decisions on its behalf that will result in the entity generating  
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profitable returns for its shareholder. A concern relating to an agent-principle relation is 
that the agent may not always act in the best interest of the principle (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  A situation can therefore arise where the management of an 
entity decide to withhold or release information in relation to a company as they have the 
power to do so through their power to control the company as the agent (Rossouw, van 
der Watt and Malan, 2012). The need for an appropriate mechanism to align the interests 
of both the agent and principle is therefore an imperative (Fontrodona and Sison, 2006). 
Corporate governance and as such integrated reporting provides a mechanism for 
management and the board of directors of an entity to be held accountable to its 
shareholders and act in their best interests at all times (IIRC, 2013; IOD, 2009). 
2.3 The Importance of State Owned Companies 
The importance that state owned companies play in the economy has been a topic of 
debate for many years (Adjasi and Mbo, 2013). A state owned company is defined as a 
government owned entity that provides services by following a business based model 
where profits are generated in the provision of a service rather than operating on a non-
profit basis with total government control (GiIdenhuys, Fox and Wissink, 1991). The 
Government acts as an ‘economic entrepreneur’ when they provide services to the public 
via a state owned company (GiIdenhuys et al., 1991). State owned companies importance 
to the economy as a whole thus cannot be ignored (PWC, 2015). The performance of state 
owned companies is therefore a vital issue that needs to be addressed (Adjasi and Mbo, 
2013). State owned companies are generally protected from business failure as a result of 
government backing which ensures this does not occur (Wong, 2004). A question that can 
therefore be raised is whether the notion of not being able to fail may lead to the board and 
management of a state owned company to become complacent in their duties  thereby 
hampering entity value creation due to their failure to operate the entity in and effective 
and efficient manner  (IOD and PWC, 2011). This stems from the fact that the board of 
directors and management of a state owned entity effectively operate with the promise of 
financial support from government who will bailout a state owned company in the national 
interest of the country no matter its performance (IOD and PWC, 2011). This highlights the 
need for an effective oversight and performance mechanism to require the board and 
management to be held accountable (IOD and PWC, 2011). This view is shared by Adjasi 
and Mbo (2013) where it was discovered that in order to ensure the performance of state 
owned companies, government should to the best of their ability equip the management of 
state owned companies with the necessary skills to make informed decisions and more 
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importantly, state owned companies should have an appropriate oversight mechanism to 
ensure performance. 
 
2.4 Accountability by State Owned Entities 
The need for accountability from public sector organizations has been driven not only by 
government but by all interested stakeholders of the relevant public sector entities (KPMG, 
2012). The lack of an appropriate oversight mechanism and as such accountability, has 
led to a lack of governance by state owned entities (IOD and PWC, 2011). This often leads 
to unfulfilled mandates that these institutions are required to meet (IOD and PWC, 2011). 
The study by Chiu and Hung (2004) asserted that there has been very little research 
undertaken on the topic of accountability of state owned companies. Sinclair (1995) 
confirms this assertion as accountability in the public sector is often viewed as difficult to 
achieve. Furthermore, it can be seen that accountability in the public sector is developing 
and is a continued work in progress (Sands, 2004). Reddy (2004) suggested that 
improvements in terms of governance by state owned companies globally are however, 
slacking compared to improvements made in the private sector. The need for state owned 
companies to undertake greater accountability has been driven mainly due to social, 
economic and technological forces that are experienced in respect of the use of taxpayers’ 
money (Hoque and Moll, 2001). The notion according to Rivlin (1995) is that globalization 
and dissatisfaction of taxpayers in respect of the use of funds by the state has 
consequently led to accountability becoming a key issue of state owned companies which 
cannot be ignored.   
 
According to Luke (2010) accountability in the context of state owned companies is a 
difficult act to balance. This stems from the multiplicity of interests and objectives which 
are opposing in some circumstances as state owned companies are government owned 
but commercially run as a conventional for-profit business (Luke, 2010).  Furthermore, 
Luke (2010) states that state owned companies have opposing objectives as they have a 
duty to make a profit but also to meet certain social and environmental objectives. This 
makes defining the ‘boundary of accountability’ by state owned companies a difficult and 
often a complex issue (Luke, 2010). This is further exuberated by the fact that 
stakeholders of state owned companies often do not understand their roles, 
responsibilities and boundaries in relation to the state owned company, as these are often 
unclear (IOD and PWC, 2011). The Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa (2012) 
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found that, governance disclosures of state owned companies were lacking and is in need 
of improvement with transparency being a vital concern. Integrated reporting as it will be 
discussed below can thus provide the answer to these concerns (IOD and PWC, 2011). 
2.5 How Integrated Reporting Can Aid State Owned Companies in Achieving 
Accountability 
Integrated reporting can assist state owned companies to achieve accountability (KPMG, 
2012). The reason is that integrated reporting can be adapted to take the goals of state 
owned companies into account (KPMG, 2012). Furthermore, integrated reporting will 
enable state owned companies to address factors that are of concern to a vast number of 
stakeholders who have an interest in their performance (KPMG, 2012). Nkonki (2014) 
further affirmed that integrated reporting can assist in ensuring that a state owned 
company makes sustainable decisions for which the stakeholders of the organization can 
see the performance thereof. Due to the framework that is provided by integrated reports, 
state owned companies can focus on their principle objectives (KPMG, 2012). This is as 
integrated reporting allows for a state owned company to clearly state its objectives and 
strategies which reflect the company’s constraints and contrasting expectations from 
different stakeholders (KPMG, 2012). KPMG (2012) discusses that whilst integrated 
reporting was originally an initiative focused on the private sector, the application of 
integrated reporting to state owned companies is relevant. An example may be given from 
the how the poor performance of a private sector entity leads to divestment by capital 
markets based on the documentation in its integrated report. Hence, stakeholders of state 
owned companies may seek a change in management or the political situation given a 
similar situation in a state owned company (KPMG, 2012).  
Integrated reporting can be carried out by state owned companies by means of applying 
the King Report and Code of Governance Principles for South Africa 2009 (King III). This 
is as King III “applies to all entities regardless of the manner and form of incorporation or 
establishment and whether in the public, private sectors or non-profit sectors’’ (IOD, 
2009:16). The King III report is a principles based framework that can be used to prepare 
integrated reports (IOD, 2009). As such King III can be applied by state owned companies 
(IOD, 2009).  King III in terms of application to state owned entities is also very 
accommodating as King III is a principle based framework which operates on an ‘apply or 
explain’ principle (IOD, 2009). As such, it does not lead to a situation where an entity must 
comply with a so called ‘one size fits all’ framework but rather allows for an entity to adapt 
principles based on its own characteristics and size in a bespoke manner (IOD, 2009). 
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Integrated reporting by state owned companies can also be achieved by the application of 
IIRC’s IR Framework. This is as the IR Framework is principles based and applicable to 
both public and private sector entities.  As a result, integrated reporting can provide the 
answer to state owned companies lack of governance and can aid them to improve their 
business. A discussion of defining integrated reporting, the issues relating to integrated 
reports and its benefits in today’s ever changing economy are therefore relevant for this 
study and have been discussed below. 
2.6 What Is Integrated Reporting and What Are Its Benefits and Drawbacks? 
An integrated reporting is defined as a report that “demonstrates the linkages between an 
organisation’s strategy, governance and financial performance and the social, 
environmental and economic context within which it operates. By reinforcing these 
connections, Integrated Reporting can help business to take more sustainable decisions 
and enable investors and other stakeholders to understand how an organisation is really 
performing.” (IIRC, 2011:7). From the aforementioned definition, it can be seen that 
integrated reporting aims to create a concise strategic picture of an entity’s ability to create 
and maintain value both in the short and long-term (Adams and Simnett, 2011). This is 
achieved by integrated reporting reflecting the areas that create value in an entity including 
social, environmental and governance issues which should be reported on with qualitative 
information playing an important role (Adams and Simnett, 2011). 
 
In respect of the issues with integrated reporting, Atkins and Maroun (2014) discovered 
that integrated reports lacked conciseness and were exceptionally lengthy, with 
information that in most cases was repetitive and difficult to understand. Furthermore, 
Atkins and Moroun (2014) study found that printing vast amounts of information in excess 
of 500 pages in most cases were in direct contrast with the substance of sustainability. 
This sentiment is echoed by Adams and Simnett (2011:294), where integrated reports are 
described as “merely exacerbating the already overwhelming amount of disclosure 
provided without adding further insight”. It is evident that the needs that integrated reports 
were supposedly required to fulfil are left unfulfilled due to the complexity of interpreting 
and reviewing the information presented. Apart from regulatory reasons, entities have 
begun to adopt integrated reporting to exhibit to the public with a focus on their 
stakeholders in particular, that their corporate behaviour is acceptable regarding social and 
environmental issues (Lozano and Huisingh, 2011). Although this is a step in the right 
direction, many of these reports are not balanced and serve more as a marketing exercise 
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focusing on creating a good corporate image rather than providing a balanced report in 
relation to social, environmental and governance issues (Adams and Larrinaga-Gonzalez 
2007; Tilt, 2001). This ultimately leads to integrated reports failing to meet their purported 
purpose (Adams and Larrinaga-Gonzalez 2007; Tilt, 2001).  In a similar light, it seems that 
entities are preparing integrated reports based on face value in a sense that they are more 
focused on meeting all the requirements of an integrated report rather than accounting for 
the substance of the integrated report correctly (Atkins and Maroun, 2014). The 
development of the IIRC’s IIR framework may solve this by following a principle based 
approach to integrated reporting. The lack of assurance over integrated reports is also a 
factor of concern as investors and the broader group of stakeholders are more comfortable 
and perceive greater reliance on assured reports on social and environmental issues 
(Jones and Solomon, 2010; Atkins and Maroun, 2014). 
 
The IIRC explained that the benefits of integrated reporting is that it provides a more 
comprehensive account of the performance of an entity than that of traditional reporting as 
it makes apparent the use and dependence of an entity’s financial, manufactured, human, 
intellectual, natural and social capitals together with the entity’s impact and access to them 
(IIRC Discussion Paper, 2011). Additionally, integrated reporting considers risks as part of 
the substance of its disclosures thus providing a more in depth insight into all the issues 
facing the entity (Atkins and Maroun, 2014). Integrated reporting allows for a wide 
coverage of an entity’s activities in a single report (Atkins and Maroun, 2014). This is done 
by means of integrating the strategic objectives of an entity with the entity’s performance 
and sustainability issues (Atkins and Maroun, 2014).  This has led to entities that operate 
in countries where integrated reporting is mandatory like South Africa to have a more 
respected reputation in global financial markets and enhanced their competiveness 
internationally (Atkins and Maroun, 2014). The benefit of using integrated reporting will 
thus aid state owned companies achieve accountability (Sands, 2004) and become more 
respectable not only locally but internationally.  
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The diagram below summarises some of the import benefits of integrated reporting 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Diagram of the benefits of the integrated reporting (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2014). 
 
2.7 Integrated Reporting and King III 
An integrated report is a single document that pools together an entity’s financial and non-
financial performance information (Eccles and Saltzman, 2011). This allows for the 
financial performance of an entity to be evaluated in light of the entity’s negative or positive 
impact on the community in which it operates (IOD, 2009). The driving force behind the 
adoption and development of integrated reporting can be attributed to the King III Report 
(Eccles and Saltzman, 2011). King III was developed by Professor Mervin King with the 
aim of making South Africa a country where corporate governance and leadership is 
maintained to the highest standard (IOD, 2009). Maintaining high standards in corporate 
governance and leadership in Professor Mervin King’s view would hold South African 
corporations in good light globally and in effect improve the economic prospects of entities 
that adopt it (IOD, 2009). 
The benefits of 
integrated 
reporting
Provides 
information 
which is in 
greater harmony 
with the needs 
of investors.
Increases the 
accuracy of non-
financial 
information that 
is made 
available.
Enhances the 
level of 
confidence of key 
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management.
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management 
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of opportunities.
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commitment to 
investors and 
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and in the process 
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attraction and 
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King III
Chapter 1: 
Ethical  
leadership and 
corporate 
citizenship.
Chapter 2: 
Boards and 
directors
Chapter 3: Audit 
committees
Chapter 4: The 
governance of 
risk
Chapter 5: The 
governance of 
information 
technology 
Chapter 6: 
Compliance 
with laws, rules, 
codes and 
standards Chapter 7: 
Internal audit
Chapter 8: 
Governing 
stakeholder 
relationships 
Chapter 9: 
Integrated 
reporting and 
disclosure. 
King III operates on a ‘comply or explain’ basis (IOD, 2009). Based on the report 
conducted by the IOD (2009) King III recognises the fact that entities vary in size and 
nature therefore having a requirement to comply or face legal sanctions, could be 
burdensome to business given the cost of compliances  ultimately may lead to entities 
complying with rules at the expense of what is truly important-performance. 
King III consists of 9 chapters as illustrated in the diagram below. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Diagram illustrating the different chapters which make up the King III report 
(IOD, 2009) 
Each chapter of the King III report relates to specific areas of corporate governance 
(Makiwane, 2012). It is thus vital that each chapter of the King III report be addressed 
given each one’s importance to any integrated report (Makiwane, 2012). A discussion of 
each chapter will ensue in order to shed some light on the details of each chapter of the 
King III report as it forms part of the indicators used in this research study to understand 
the trends in integrated reporting by state owned entities and if they are applying these 
principles effectively. 
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2.7.1 Chapter 1: Ethical Leadership and Corporate Citizenship 
King III sets out that there should be a top down approach to ethics and ethical leadership 
in an entity (IOD, 2009). Members of the board of directors should create an environment 
that values ethical conduct to the highest level (IOD, 2009). The board of the company 
should lead by example and make ethical decisions that are not only in line with laws and 
regulations but are truly ethical when considering the entity’s stakeholders. The entity 
should as such make decisions that are morally correct and not just conform with the 
norms of the industry. This sentiment is echoed in Michaelson (2006) study where 
compliance is described as a necessary condition for ethics but insufficient on its own. 
This principle can be understood by means of the following hypothetical example. 
State owned entity A manufactures product X in an extremely profitable manner 
generating a profit margin of 58% in the process. The production of product X results in a 
dangerous hazardous gas, Gas Y being released into the air that can cause server illness 
to those who inhale it. According to the law entities must not generate more than 500 
kilograms of Gas Y per year. State owned entity A generates 400 kilograms of Gas Y per 
year as a result of its production of product X. State owned entity A is thus in compliance 
with the law. State owned entity A is aware that Gas Y is a severe hazard to the 
community and that an alternative  process to manufacture product X without releasing 
Gas Y is available but will reduce profit margins by 8% to  50%. State owned entity A does 
not change its process nor does it plan to as it believes it is in compliance with the law and 
as such it is behaving ethically. 
From the above example it is clear that complying with laws alone does not result in ethical 
behaviour. ‘‘The idea that ethics matters is fundamental to Integrity Strategy’s implicit 
claim, consistent with conventional wisdom and moral theory, that the objective of 
responsible conduct cannot be achieved solely by imposing from outside what is required 
but must also appeal to what is desired’’ (Michaelson, 2006:1). Michaelson’s (2006) 
conclusion clearly indicates that ethics must be driven from within an organization. As a 
result entities should stand on a firm ethical foundation based on the ethical values of 
responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency (IOD, 2009). This will aid state 
owned companies who face a lack of accountability and are in need of a means to improve 
this position (Sands, 2004). 
King III requires an entity should consider the economic, environmental and social impact 
of all decisions taken (IOD, 2009). An example of this application can be seen in an entity 
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such as Eskom. Eskom in its pursuit of electricity generation at a profit should also 
consider the impact of pollution from the generation of electricity on the environment and if 
it may be possible to hire members of the local community at its power plants. Furthermore 
the board of an entity should ensure that there is a code of conduct in place which is 
understandable and communicated to all employees (IOD, 2009). King III goes on to state 
that in developing a code of conduct, ethical standards should be present to aid 
relationships with internal and external stakeholders (IOD, 2009). This addresses the ever 
evolving need to take stakeholders interests into account (Atkins and Maroun, 2014). 
King III requires that the board should set out the strategic direction of the entity (IOD, 
2009). The mission and vision of the entity should be clearly understandable and guide the 
objectives and strategies that are implemented in a manner that considers the community 
in which the entity operates (IOD, 2009). Sustainability can thus be moved forward by 
linking the vision and mission of an entity to sustainability objectives (Mirvis, Googins and 
Kinnicutt, 2010). In essence the board should take the needs of every stakeholder into 
account considering different strategies and the impact certain decisions and risks will 
have on them (IOD, 2009). As state owned companies are in need of guidance  in respect 
of making strategic decisions (Adjasi and Mbo, 2013) setting the strategic direction and 
objectives  of the entity in a clear and understandable manner per King III, may assist in 
this regard to ensure that state owned companies can focus on their principle objectives 
(KPMG, 2012). 
2.7.2 Chapter 2: The Board and Directors 
King III deals in detail with issues pertaining to directors and the board of directors (IOD, 
2009). Firstly King III requires that there should be a balance of power on the board with 
the majority of directors being independent non-executive directors so as to not allow one 
group of people to exercise unanimous control (IOD, 2009). The reason is to ensure that 
shareholders and other relevant stakeholder’s needs are adequately taken into account in 
all decisions made (IOD, 2009). In addition, King III requires that the board of directors be 
representative in terms of demographics and gender when constituted (IOD, 2009). Esser 
and Dekker (2008) asserted that this is especially important in South Africa where Broad 
Based Black Economic Empowerment aims to correct racial imbalances of the past and 
empower previously disadvantaged groups. 
King III requires that the directors collectively have the necessary skill, expertise and 
experience to undertake their duties (IOD, 2009). The skills and experience of each 
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director is also required to be disclosed in the integrated report (IOD, 2009). The 
independence of directors is vital as a result; King III has various requirements that are 
required to be met in order for a director to be regarded as an independent director as well 
as ongoing assessments to ensure director independence (IOD, 2009). Director induction, 
training and performance evaluation is also dealt with in this section with the process of 
sourcing new directors delegated by the board to a board subcommittee called the 
nomination committee (IOD, 2009).  Given the need for skilful management by state 
owned entities due to their importance (Adjasi and Mbo, 2013), the requirements of King III 
in this regard may aid in fulfilling this need. 
King III requires that the role of the chairman of the board and that of the chief executive 
officer be separate with a lead independent director being appointed in the case of the 
chairman not meeting independence requirements (IOD, 2009). This is to avoid a conflict 
of interest and make sure  that directors act in the best interest of the entity at all times 
(IOD, 2009)  which is not only a requirement of King III but also of the Companies Act . By 
complying with King III a state owned company will as a result be in compliance with some 
of the requirements of the Companies Act (IOD, 2009). Furthermore, the lack of 
governance by state owned entities (IOD and PWC, 2011) can be mitigated to a certain 
extent by ensuring the chairman of the board is independent (IOD, 2009). 
King III further requires that the board have a charter in place outline the duties and 
responsibilities of the board (IOD, 2009).  Moreover the board is advised to create sub-
board committees to deal with issues such as remuneration polices, risks, nomination of 
directors and audit related matters (IOD, 2009). Although not a requirement for all 
companies, public and state owned companies must establish an audit committee per the 
requirements of the Companies Act. The board may create sub-board committees and 
delegated duties to them however the board still retains full responsibility for all decisions 
made and tasks required to be completed (IOD, 2009).  
Remuneration of all directors executive and non-executive as well of at least the three top 
paid employees must be disclosed in the integrated report of an entity in the interest of the 
promotion of transparency by the entity (IOD, 2009). This is vital as stakeholders require 
greater transparency and accountability by entities in today’s economic world (Atkins and 
Maroun, 2014; Jones and Solomon, 2010; KPMG, 2012). Furthermore remuneration of 
directors has to be approved by the shareholders of the entity (IOD, 2009). Accountability 
in this regard is of particularly importance to state owned companies due to their traditional 
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poor performance (World Bank , 2007)  due to taxpayers curiosity if their hard earned 
money is being wasted or inappropriately utilized (Hoque and Moll, 2001). 
A further requirement of King III is that the directors of the board should develop and 
approve the entity’s strategy (IOD, 2009). The entity’s strategy should be in line with the 
entity’s vision and mission and take risk into account in order to achieve a sustainable 
outcome for all of its stakeholders. 
In totality issues relating to director training, independence, conduct, performance and 
suitability are dealt with extensively in King III to ensure the highest level of integrity and 
ethics is maintained (IOD, 2009). Application of King III in this regard can aid state owned 
companies in achieving transparency and accountability and ultimately improve 
performance (KPMG, 2012).   
2.7.3 Chapter 3: Audit Committee 
King III requires that an entity should appoint an audit committee (IOD, 2009). This is also 
a statutory requirement of the Companies Act for public and state owned companies. King 
III makes provision for the nomination committee of an entity to assist the board in 
appointing members to the audit committee (IOD, 2009). The audit committee should 
comprise of a minimum three independent non-executive directors (IOD, 2009). A 
chairman should be elected to the audit committee who is an independent non-executive 
director and not the chairman of the board of directors (IOD, 2009). Each member of the 
audit committee must be suitably qualified to carry out the functions of the committee to 
ensure that collectively, the committee has the necessary skills and expertise to carry out 
its function (IOD, 2009). The study conducted by Klein (2002) found that there was a 
negative relationship between audit committee independence, the occurrence of abnormal 
financial accruals and possible earnings management. This emphasises the need for a 
thoroughly independent audit committee for which King III makes provision. The expertise 
of the audit committee also plays a role in ensuring that the committee carries out its 
duties effectively (Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau, 2004). Bedard et al. 2004 found that 
there was a negative relationship between experience of the audit committee members 
and earnings management. This further supports the requirements of King III in relation to 
audit committee member’s experience.  
King III requires that the audit committee meet at least twice a year with an agenda 
prepared in advance by the chairman (IOD, 2009).  Gendron and Bedard (2006) concur 
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that the greater the amount of effective audit committee meetings attended and held, the 
more effective the audit committee will be in carrying out its duties.  
The audit committee is responsible to oversee that internal financial controls operate 
effectively and that the financial function’s performance, skills and expertise is 
appropriately assessed (IOD, 2009). This includes assessing the performance of the 
financial director and ensuring controls are in place over the financial function. Given the 
poor performance of state owned companies (World Bank, 2007) assessing the 
performance of the financial function may aid state owned companies to improve their 
financial performance.  Furthermore, the audit committee should oversee and assist the 
risk management function as well as ensure that the internal audit function (IAF) operates 
effectively (IOD, 2009). These requirements are over and above the requirement that the 
audit committee evaluate the performance, independence and recommend the 
appointment of the external auditors (IOD, 2009). An effective audit committee will aid in 
reducing fraud, abnormalities in the entity and earnings management (Bedard et al., 2004). 
As a result these requirements set forth by King III if implemented, can be seen to aid in 
reducing fraud, abnormalities in the entity and earnings management as it will allow the 
audit committee to be effective in carrying out their responsibilities via a guided process. A 
state owned company may eradicate fears that taxpayers have in relation to the abuse of 
taxpayer funds (Hoque and Moll, 2001) by applying the above recommendations per King 
III. 
2.7.4 Chapter 4: The Governance of Risk 
King III suggest that a risk committee be established by the board to be responsible for risk 
or if a separate risk committee is not established the audit committee should assist the 
board in carrying out its risk responsibilities (IOD, 2009). If a separate risk committee is 
formed it should consist of at least three directors who in this case can be either executive 
or non-executive directors and should meet at least twice a year (IOD, 2009). The risk 
management committee should as part of its function identify all the financial and non-
financial risks, how they will mitigate both the financial and non-financial risks as well as 
setting the level of risk tolerance that the entity can bare in its present stage, in the 
integrated report (IOD, 2009). Furthermore, the risk committee should express its view of 
the overall effectiveness of the entity’s risk management process in the entity’s integrated 
report (IOD, 2009).  
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The lack of risk information about an entity is one of the major weakness of accounting 
information disclosed (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). Investors require information not only on 
an entity’s return but risk as well as in order to make an informed investment decisions 
(Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). Without information on risk an investor cannot make an 
informed decision on whether to invest or not in a particular entity (Cabedo and Tirado, 
2004). Hence, this will cause an investor to make the wrong investment decision (Cabedo 
and Tirado, 2004). Risk disclosure is thus vital in order to ensure that investors and 
stakeholders alike receive the necessary information about the entity so as to make 
appropriate decisions (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). King III’s requirement to disclose risk 
facing the entity and the steps the entity will undertake to mitigate these risks both financial 
and non-financial result in a transparent account of the entity’s affairs which is especially 
important in state owned given their lack of accountability (KPMG, 2012). 
2.7.5 Chapter 5: The Governance of Information Technology  
Information technology (IT) plays an important role in the current business world 
(Posthumus, Von Solms and King, 2010). It was possible in the past to overlook the 
importance and effect that IT had on business however in more recent times, IT has 
become a means of both competitive advantage and failure (Van Grembergen and De 
Haes, 2009). IT has an impact on the strategy of a business and can help a business 
achieve its objectives if it is correctly aligned to the strategy of the entity (Van Grembergen 
and De Haes, 2009). Failure to align IT with the businesses strategy could not only be 
costly in terms of the huge investment that is required to implement IT systems that may 
go to waste but may even spell failure of the business due to a loss of competitive 
advantage to competitors (Van Grembergen and De Haes, 2009). IT provides new risks 
and challenges to an entity (Posthumus, Von Solms and King, 2010). Van Grembergen 
and De Haes (2009) confirms this assertion as computer systems may experience 
downtime, network failure and may even malfunction. These risk need to be mitigated and 
a plan should be in place to address such issues (Van Grembergen and De Haes, 2009). 
Furthermore, IT gives rise to increased security risk due to hacking of computer systems 
and theft of valuable information that must be assessed continuously and mitigated 
effectively (Van Grembergen and De Haes, 2009).   
An example of where technology can aid a state owned entity is in the aviation industry. By 
running the latest systems in terms booking flights for example, a low cost state owned 
airline can make the experience for its clients simple, convenient and cost effective. This 
may create a competitive advantage for the state owned entity over its competitors (Van 
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Grembergen and De Haes, 2009). Whereas if a low cost state owned airline implements a 
costly bookings system that is aimed to address the needs of affluent clientele who usually 
values luxury over anything else this may cause the entity to fail. This is as the technology 
used by the low cost airline would not be in line with its strategy. 
As described above IT presents opportunities and threats to entities in today’s modern 
business world. Governance of IT is thus a key requirement (Trautman and Altenbaumer-
Price, 2011). IT governance can be defined as “the organizational capacity exercised by 
the board, executive management and IT management to control the formulation and 
implementation of IT strategy and in this way ensure the fusion of business and IT’’ (Van 
Grembergen, 2002:1). Most boards however lack oversight over IT investment, strategy 
and risk (Nolan and McFarlan, 2005). This lack of oversight by boards is extremely 
hazardous and is comparable to the risk an entity would face had it failed to have its 
financial statements audited (Nolan and McFarlan, 2005). Board responsibility for the 
active governance of IT is thus the difference between IT aiding an entity to achieve its 
objectives and IT just becoming a dead investment or even worse, a source of failure to an 
entity (Nolan and McFarlan, 2005; Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price, 2011).  
King III recognises the need for IT governance and provides a framework for the board of 
an entity to base their IT governance (Posthumus, Von Solms and King, 2010). King III 
require that the board appoint a chief information officer (CIO) to manage the IT function 
and report regularly to the board on IT matters (IOD, 2009).  The board should ensure that 
the entity complies with the relevant laws, codes and regulations in relation to IT as well as 
evaluate significant IT expenditure and investment on a regular basis and document this in 
the integrated report (IOD, 2009).  The board of the entity should also consider the risk 
implications of IT including the financial risk implications and document this in the entity’s 
integrated report (IOD, 2009). King III recommends that the audit committee and any other 
committee for that matter should consider implementing IT to streamline their activities 
(IOD, 2009). Finally it is recommended that the board receives assurance over the 
effectiveness of IT through eternal or external assurance providers (IOD, 2009). Based on 
the aforementioned discussion, IT and its effective governance can aid any entity including 
state owned ones in achieving a competitive advantage (Posthumus et al., 2010; Van 
Grembergen and De Haes, 2009). 
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2.7.6 Chapter 6: Compliance with Laws, Rules, Codes and Standards 
Compliance with laws and regulations can be a costly and often complicated affair for 
many entities (Ly et al., 2015). King III recommends that compliance with laws, regulations 
and codes should be seen as an ethical imperative (IOD, 2009).  Per the Companies Act, 
companies must comply with all laws applicable. King III thus acts as a vehicle to ensure 
compliance by providing a framework for the implementation of continuous monitoring of 
compliance with applicable laws (IOD, 2009). King III recommends that the board create a 
compliance function that will be responsible for monitoring compliance with applicable laws 
and regulations, reporting non-compliance and taking steps to address those specific 
areas where non-compliance is occurring (IOD, 2009). Hence, the directors of an entity 
should ensure that they are aware of the laws, rules, regulations and standards that are 
applicable to the entity, have an understanding of them and should undertake continuous 
training to update their understanding of them (IOD, 2009). Director training and 
development aids in giving an entity competitive advantage (Longnecker and Ariss, 2002) 
thus King III’s recommendation in regards to training of and awareness by directors of the 
compliance requirements of an entity is an effective method to allow the entity to gain a 
completive advantage and operate more effectively.  Due to the increased need for 
transparency from state owned entities that is required by stakeholders (KPMG, 2012), 
King III recommends that the board of directors of an entity should disclose in its 
integrated report, the relevant laws, codes and standards binding and non-binding to which 
to which it adheres to as well as, how the board discharged their duties to have an 
effective compliance framework and process in place (IOD, 2009).  Providers of capital 
furthermore require a greater level of non-financial information than they did before in 
order to make decisions based on all the facts and circumstances surrounding an entity 
(Frias-Aceituno et al., 2014). Disclosing compliance with laws and regulations per King III 
can therefore assist in meeting the needs of providers of capital in the current business 
environment as illustrated in the hypothetical example below. 
Investor A want to purchase bonds issued by either State owned entity X or State owned 
entity Y. State owned entity X and State owned entity Y’s  bonds are both for sale for R100 
(South African Rands) each . Both make the same amount of profit and have the same net 
asset value. The only difference is that State owned entity X does not comply with certain 
laws and as such may face penalties in the future. If Investor A is not aware of this non-
compliance as it was not disclosed in State owned entity A’s integrated report, Investor A 
may choose to invest in State owned entity X on the assumption that both State owned 
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entity X and State owned entity Y have the same risk thus making an ill-informed 
investment decision due to the lack of information. 
2.7.7 Chapter 7: Internal Audit 
The fraud scandals that have rocked the financial world  such as that of Enron has led to 
the increased importance of corporate governance and the role that the IAF can play in 
preventing corporate scandals from occurring in the future (Bailey, Gramling and 
Ramamoorti, 2003). Corporate governance is comprised of four keystones namely: the 
external audit function, the IAF, the audit committee and management (Gramling, Maletta, 
Schneider and Church, 2004). King III requires that an entity set up an IAF either internally 
or by means of outsourcing the function to an entity that is appropriately qualified and 
capable to carry out this function (IOD, 2009). Research has shown that the IAF may have 
a positive effect on corporate governance by aiding in improving reporting quality and 
entity performance (Gramling et al., 2004). This is of particular importance to state owned 
entities given their pitiable performance due to a lack of professionalism and poor internal 
governance (World Bank, 2007). In Schneider and Wilner (1990), it was discovered that if 
the IAF operates effectively, fraud and theft by employees and irregularities in financial 
reporting are dissuaded. Where the independence of the IAF is maintained by means of 
ensuring they report to those charged with governance and not management, it is more 
likely an effective control environment will result for the entity (Gramling et al., 2004).  The 
IAF is thus a supporting structure to the audit committee, external auditors and 
management in order improve corporate governance in an entity (Gramling et al., 2004). 
The pressure faced by audit committees to oversee and ensure good corporate 
governance in an entity has led to them relying to a greater extent on the IAF (Hermanson, 
2002). As a result the relationship between the audit committee and the IAF is of great 
importance (Gramling et al., 2004). King III provides that the IAF should be headed up by a 
chief audit executive (CAE) who should report functionally to the audit committee chairman 
(IOD, 2009). This makes sense as the CAE is seen as a person or company that adds 
value to the corporate governance process and is strategically placed to communicate to 
the audit committee chair, the value that the IAF has added to the corporate governance of 
the entity by means of compliance with internal audit quality drivers (Van Staden and 
Steyn, 2009). King III requires that the CAE attend audit committee and board meetings 
(IOD,2009) which further portrays the importance of the relationship between the audit 
committee and the IAF (Gramling et al., 2004).  
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The audit committee of an entity is responsible for good corporate governance (Gramling 
et al., 2004). According to Gramling et al., (2004:195) ‘‘corporate governance comprises of 
the procedures and activities employed by the representatives of an organization’s 
stakeholders to provide oversight of risk and control processes administered by 
management’. As a result the audit committee and board of the entity rely on IAF to 
provide assurance over the effectiveness of internal controls and governance (IOD, 2009). 
The IAF’s audit plan should be risk based through guidance from the strategy and risks of 
the entity (IOD, 2009). As a result, the IAF should provide assurance over the 
effectiveness of the entity’s risk management (IOD 2009). A risk based internal audit 
approach can be seen as a means to improve internal audit performance and entity risk 
management (McNamee and Selim, 1999).  The reason is that a risk based internal audit 
approach addresses current issues and anxieties facing an entity (McNamee and Selim, 
1999).  Furthermore, a risk based audit approach also addresses the level of readiness of 
an entity to manage issues in the future by foreseeing changes in the entity and assessing 
methods in which management can address future risks more effectively (McNamee and 
Selim, 1999). This can aid state owned entities in ensuring effective internal control and as 
a result good governance. Moreover the focus on risks can aid in strategy implantation by 
state owned entities that currently face poor strategy identification and execution (IOD and 
PWC, 2011).   
Lastly, King III recommends that an entity should document in its integrated report the 
board’s responsibility for the process and functioning of the internal control function (IOD, 
2009). 
2.7.8 Chapter 8: Governing Stakeholder Relationships 
The focus of considering the legitimate interests of stakeholders in today’s business world 
has become more important than ever (IOD, 2009). State owned companies currently 
have poor relationships with their stakeholders who often do not understand their roles and 
responsibilities in relation to the entity (IOD and PWC, 2011). Stakeholder theory suggests 
all parties who have an interest in an entity should be considered in operating the entity 
and not just those of the shareholders (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholders of an organisation 
consist of customers, suppliers, the community in which the entity operates, shareholders, 
employees and providers of finance (IOD, 2009). Stakeholder management requires that 
an entity manage its relations with stakeholders given that the perceptions of stakeholders 
can ultimately affect the reputation of an entity (IOD, 2009). Stakeholder management has 
proven to be effective in improving shareholder value (Hillman and Keim, 2001).  Hillman 
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and Keim (2001:135) asserted this as a ‘‘sustainable organizational advantage may be 
built with tacit assets that derive from developing relationships with key stakeholders: 
customers, employees, suppliers and communities where businesses operate’’. As a 
result, the benefits derived from an entity serving an elongated role in society by engaging 
with stakeholders effectively benefits not only the relevant stakeholder but increases 
shareholder wealth in the process (Hillman and Keim, 2001).  Differentiating an entity by 
means of engaging proactively in an effective and efficient manner will provide an entity 
with a completive advantage where competition is rife between entities (Hillman and Keim, 
2001).   
King III requires that the board of an entity identify key stakeholders at the beginning as a 
starting point to understand the legitimate needs and interests of the stakeholder groups 
(IOD, 2009).   This is required in order to consider key stakeholders in the operations of 
the entity (IOD, 2009).  In essence “the stakeholder approach is about concrete “names 
and faces” for stakeholders rather than merely analysing particular stakeholder roles” 
(Freeman and McVea, 2001:14). Freeman and McVea (2001) emphasises that it is vital to 
identify the stakeholders who have an interest in the firm and can affect it (Freeman and 
McVea, 2001). This is as it is only once the relevant stakeholders are identified that an 
entity can effectively considers strategies and methods of operation that take stakeholders 
concerns into account and receive their support (Freeman and McVea, 2001). 
Consequentially, it is through effective communications with the stakeholder groupings that 
the gap between stakeholder’s expectations and an entity’s performance as King III 
describes, can be managed. 
Effective communication between an entity and stakeholders of the entity is dealt with 
extensively in King III. King III recommends that the board of directors encourage 
stakeholders to attend the entity’s annual general meeting and voice their opinion on 
matters that concern them (IOD, 2009). King III provides that the board of the entity should 
ensure equitable treatment of shareholders and protect minorities (IOD, 2009). King III 
requires that the board of directors should oversee the development of stakeholder 
policies by management to ensure that it supports rather than oppose stakeholder 
engagement (IOD, 2009). Furthermore, entity information should be accessible to 
stakeholders within the realms of strategic and legal considerations in a clear and 
understandable language (IOD, 2009). Instances where requests for information have 
been declined by the entity to stakeholders should be documented in the integrated report 
of the entity together with the reasons for the request being refused (IOD, 2009). Disputes 
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between management and stakeholders should also be resolved via dispute resolution in 
an effective and efficient manner by the board of the entity with the process for resolution 
in place before a matter arises (IOD, 2009).   
From the above, it is clear that the weak relationships experienced between state owned 
entities and its stakeholders (IOD and PWC, 2011) may be overcome by the application 
the guidance of King III as described above. 
It is recommended that the governance of stakeholder relations should be documented in 
the entity’s integrated report in the interest of transparency and good governance (IOD, 
2009). In all, King III provides a framework to guide the board of directors and the entity to 
engage effectively with its stakeholders in the interest of good corporate governance. 
2.7.9 Chapter 9: Integrated Reporting and Disclosure 
Integrated reporting has evolved through an evolutionary process from two separate 
reports, one portraying financial information and the other, the sustainability report 
(Solomon and Maroun, 2012). Integrated reports now contains far greater disclosure of 
risk, new reporting items and the coupling of social, ethical and environmental information 
into aspects of corporate governance in a single report (Solomon and Maroun, 2012). The 
integrated report as it stands currently has created the need for a shift in directors of an 
entity’s priorities, to one with a greater focus on stakeholder engagement and 
accountability (Solomon and Maroun, 2012). King III recommends that an integrated report 
be prepared yearly as a single report (IOD, 2009). The report should provide information 
on both the financial performance and sustainability information of the entity (IOD, 2009). 
The integrated report should in essence report on the goals and strategies of the entity 
and the entity’s performance in respect of the triple bottom line being social, environmental 
and economic matters (IOD, 2009). This will ensure that stakeholders would support the 
objectives a state owned entity is aiming to achieve as it aligns the entity with the interests 
and expectations of its stakeholders (IOD, 2009). The integrated report should also focus 
on the substance of what is required to be carried out by the state owned entity as 
recommend by King III, with the report acting only as a means of information as to the 
activities undertaken by the entity and not the ultimate goal (IOD, 2009). This sentiment is 
shared by Atkins and Maroun (2014) where it was discovered that integrated reports lack 
conciseness given that entities try and fulfil all the requirements of integrated reporting 
frameworks which lead to a vast number of pages being printed. According to Atkins and 
Maroun, (2014) this is in direct contrast to the aim of sustainability and sustainability 
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reporting. Furthermore, Atkins and Maroun (2014) found that entities to tend to cover every 
reporting requirement for integrated reporting and miss the point for which King III clearly 
outlines on reporting on substance rather than form.  
Stakeholders demand greater transparency from state owned entities in terms of corporate 
reporting in the current business environment (Hoque and Moll, 2001; Rivlin, 1996). Atkins 
and Maroun (2014) found that there is a need for assurance and an assurance framework 
for integrated reporting. In the interest of greater transparency and accountability, King III 
recommends that an entity should have controls in place over the integrated reporting in 
order to safeguard its integrity (IOD, 2009). Furthermore, King III recommends that the 
board of an entity delegate the responsibility of evaluating sustainability information and 
ensuring that it does not contradict the financial information contained in the report (IOD, 
2009). Additionally, it is recommended that the integrated report including the sustainability 
information, be independently assured under the authority of the audit committee in the 
interest of reporting factual information (IOD, 2009). 
A concern in relation to integrated reporting is that it may become a public relations 
exercise and report only the positive sustainability aspects that relate to the entity (Atkins 
and Maroun, 2014). King III therefore recommends that the integrated report should be 
balanced (IOD, 2009). Reporting on both the positive and negative aspects affecting the 
entity as well as how the state owned entity plans to improve positive aspects and 
overcome the negative aspects in relation to the entity (IOD, 2009). This should be 
reported in order to assist stakeholders in making decisions in relation to the economic 
value and sustainability of an entity given the positive and negative factors facing the entity 
and the steps the entity is taking in order to build on the positive factors and mitigate the 
negative ones (IOD, 2009).   
In the interest of giving investors and other stakeholders information to aid them in 
decision making, King III recommends that an entity report on how it generates its revenue 
for the period and the effects of revenue generation on the different stakeholder groups 
(IOD, 2009). In addition, an entity should disclose its going concern status in order to aid 
stakeholders to better understand the future direction in which the entity is heading (IOD, 
2009). Disclosure of the above items are important for state owned entities where focus on 
the principle objectives of the entity is vital given the multiplicity of interests that they need 
to balance (KPMG, 2012). Furthermore, King III recognizes that there has been 
developments in formalizing sustainability reporting through frameworks such as, the IR 
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Framework and that these should be considered by entities in preparing their integrated 
reports (IOD, 2009). 
2.7.10 King III Observations and Conclusion 
From the discussion on King III and the recommendations it makes for entities, it is evident 
that King III can assist state owned entities in reaching their goals and objectives in 
respect of integrated reporting. King III goes into great detail in respect of governance 
aspects, from discussing the composition of the board of directors to the responsibilities, 
duties and lines of reporting of the board, sub-committees and management (IOD, 2009). 
King III recognizes the need for greater transparency and accountability and provides for a 
greater level of sustainability and non-financial information to be presented in order for the 
relevant stakeholders to make informed decisions concerning the state owned entity (IOD, 
2009). In doing so it also allows entities to better their corporate governance structures 
and relationships they have with stakeholders. The effect of this is that it creates a better 
business environment within the entity and ultimately benefits both interested stakeholders 
and shareholder value (Hillman and Keim, 2001).  
The next section in this report will look at the International IR Framework and its 
implications to integrate reporting by entities that apply.  
2.8 The International Integrated Reporting Framework 2013 
The rise of interconnectivity and globalisation in the world of business has created a 
scenario where finance, people and knowledge are inseparably linked to one another 
(IIRC, n.d). The 2008 global financial crisis which spread turmoil across financial markets 
all around the world has created a greater need for connecting investment decisions, 
corporate governance and reporting as world economies are yearning for greater financial 
stability and sustainable growth (IIRC, n.d). The World Bank has identified gaps in 
reporting carried out by entities specifically related to risk and future outlook, for which 
other reporting requirements and standards fail to address (IIRC, n.d).  The IR Framework 
was thus developed with the aim of facilitating integrated thinking in the world of business 
through the use of integrated reporting (IIRC, 2013).  
The IR framework is aimed more at providing effective shareholder accountability 
(Solomon and Maroun, 2012). This is evident from the IR framework which aims to provide 
information that can aid providers of financial capital in making investment decisions (IIRC, 
2013). The IR framework also seeks to address accountability in relation to the use of all 
the different sources of capital by an entity, be it financial, manufactured, social, human 
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and natural (IIRC, 2013). In addressing these capitals the IR Framework aims to provide 
users with an understanding of the inseparable link the different capitals have on one 
another and ultimately how these capitals and other factors create value for entity, not only 
in the short but medium and long-term as well (IIRC, 2013). Reports conducted by IOD 
and PWC (2012) and KPMG (2012) agree that this may prove valuable to state owned 
companies who struggle in terms of having an appropriate strategy to meet their objectives 
and who have a lack of transparency in accounting for the results of their operations. 
In a research survey on the implication of integrated reporting through a pilot programme 
of applying the IR Framework, it was discovered there was a greater connection across 
the different departments in an entity (Black Sun, 2012).  This reduced concerns from 
being considered in insolation in each department but rather allowed for integrated thinking 
and connectivity about matters across the entity (Black Sun, 2012). The implementation of 
the IR Framework in its pilot phase led to senior management taking on a greater interest 
in the long term sustainability of the entities for which they are responsible (Black Sun, 
2012).  In addition, Black Sun (2012) found that entities developed more holistic business 
models which enable management to understand their businesses and the factors that 
create and add value through implementation of the IR framework. The results of the 
application of the IR Framework in respect of integrated reporting to a state owned entity 
can be seen in the case of Eskom (Black Sun, 2015). Eskom realised the comprehensive 
nature of integrated reports as a single reference point in respect of the company’s 
information when communicating to the public regarding any questions asked about the 
entity (Black Sun, 2015). The implementation of the IR Framework has saved Eskom time 
and precious resources as all the relevant information required by the stakeholders is 
gathered in the integrated report hence, there was no need to prepare additional 
documents at a later stage (Black Sun, 2015). Furthermore, Eskom has observed benefits 
internally within the entity by means of the integrated report (Black Sun, 2015). This is as 
internal business reporting at Eskom shifted to a more integrated method of reporting thus 
allowing for a greater understanding internally of how technical performance and financial 
performance affected each other in a single report (Black Sun, 2015). 
The IR Framework is principle based and requires that an entity must comply with and 
apply certain requirements of the framework whilst others are recommended to be applied 
(IIRC, 2013). The IR Framework can be applied by both private and public sector entities 
although its focus is on private entities (IIRC, 2013). The IR Framework contains two 
elements, firstly being the guiding principles which inform how the content of as well as the 
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manner in which information is prepared and presented in the integrated report (IIRC, 
2013). Secondly, the content element which provides guidance as to what should be 
contained in the integrated report (IIRC, 2013). Both of these elements are listed in the 
diagrams below. 
 
 
Figure 2.3.1: Diagram representing the different guiding principles of the IR Framework. 
(IIRC, 2013) 
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Figure 2.3.2:  Diagram representing the content elements per the IR Framework. (IIRC, 2013) 
A discussion of each of the guiding principles and content elements will ensue in order to 
shed light on the details of each principle and element as it forms part of the indicators 
used in this research study. This will allow for an understanding of the trends in integrated 
reporting by state owned entities and if they are applying these principles effectively. 
2.8.1 Guiding Principles-Strategic Focus and Future Orientation 
The use of retrospective financial information in the current economic environment does 
not satisfy the needs of shareholders and other stakeholders who seek information 
regarding the strategies and future objectives of an entity (Eurosif, 2009). State owned 
companies have a multiplicity of interest to balance and must ensure that they have a clear 
strategy in order to meet their principle objectives (KMPG, 2012). As such the IR 
Framework requires that the integrated report describe the entity’s operating strategy, the 
effect it has on value creation and on the use of capitals available to the entity (IIRC, 
2013). Insight should be given as to the risks and opportunities that have materialised as a 
result of the entity’s market position as this will allow for a better understanding of the 
entity’s position within the market (IIRC, 2013). The views of those charged with 
governance should also be considered in the integrated report in relation to balancing 
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short, medium and long-term interests (IIRC, 2013). Furthermore, the views of those 
charged with governance should give insight as to how performance and experiences in 
the past have determined the future direction of the entity (IIRC, 2013). Ultimately, insight 
should be given as to how the strategy of an entity will make effective use of the capitals 
available to the entity to create value and achieve the entity’s objectives. 
2.8.2 Guiding Principles-Connectivity of Information 
Integrated reports should show the linkages and connectivity of financial and non-financial 
information such as management commentary and governance matters (Dumitru, Glavan, 
Gorgan and Dumitru, 2013). The IR Framework requires that an entity’s integrated report 
provide  a holistic picture of how the factors that are co-dependent on each other  create 
value for the entity over the short, medium and long-term (IIRC, 2013). This requirement is 
driven by integrated thinking and will provide vital insight into how integrated thinking is 
applied within an entity (IIRC, 2013). This is crucial for state owned companies that have 
opposing objectives to make not only a profit but also to meet certain social and 
environmental objectives (Luke, 2010). As such connectivity of information will prove 
imperative for state owned companies given the aforementioned discussion. 
2.8.3 Guiding Principles-Stakeholder Relationships 
Stakeholder management which includes identifying stakeholders, the needs and interests 
of stakeholders and managing stakeholder engagement has proven to be effective in 
improving shareholder value (Hillman and Keim, 2001).  The IR Framework requires that 
an entity should detail in its integrated report how it interacts with its key stakeholders as 
well as to what extent it takes their legitimate needs and interests into account (IIRC, 
2013). The nature and quality of stakeholder relationships should also be detailed as value 
is not created in isolation but rather through relationships (IIRC, 2013). This is vital for 
state owned entities that currently experience poor relationships with their stakeholders 
(World Bank, 2007). Furthermore, interacting with key stakeholders and maintaining good 
relationships with them can provide insights into how they perceive value and assist the 
entity in identifying risks and opportunities which otherwise would not have been 
discovered had stakeholders not provided insight into certain matters (IIRC, 2013). 
2.8.4 Guiding Principles-Materiality  
Adams and Simnett (2011:294) describes integrated reports as “merely exacerbating the 
already overwhelming amount of disclosure provided without adding further insight” in 
some instances. This clearly points to the fact that entities may have a tendency to report 
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on immaterial items in their integrated reports. The IR Framework requires that an entity 
only disclose in its integrated report matters that have the ability to affect value creation for 
the entity as those are material (IIRC, 2013). Relevant matters are matters that can affect 
an entity’s value due to its effect on an entity’s strategy, governance, performance or 
prospects (IIRC, 2013). A matter is only material it is relevant and the magnitude of the 
matter is such that it can have a substantial effect quantitatively or qualitatively on value 
creation (IIRC, 2013). Judgement should be used in determining what information should 
be disclosed about material matters in the integrated report (IIRC, 2013). 
Considering the opposing objectives of state owned entities in terms of making a profit and 
meeting certain societal objectives, defining the reporting boundary of state owned 
companies is a complex issue (Luke, 2010).  The IR Framework states that the boundary 
of what matters to disclose in the integrated report of an entity is determined based on 
matters that affect the financial reporting entity directly and those risks, opportunities and 
outcomes that are linked to stakeholders and related entities that can have an effect on 
value creation of the reporting entity itself (IIRC, 2013). 
The diagram below displays the reporting boundary of an entity. 
 
Figure 2.4: Reporting Boundary of an entity in respect of material items. (IIRC, 2013) 
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2.8.5 Guiding Principles-Conciseness 
Atkins and Maroun (2014) discovered that integrated reports lacked conciseness with 
information that in most cases was repetitive and difficult to understand. The IR 
Framework requires that an entity should prepare an integrated reported that has 
adequate information in order for the strategy, governance, performance and prospects of 
the entity to be understood (IIRC, 2013). In arriving at a level of conciseness that is 
appropriate, the integrated report of an entity should not impair the completeness and 
comparability of the report (IIRC, 2013). The determination of what is material will assist in 
determining the balance between conciseness and comparability as well as completeness 
(IIRC, 2013). 
2.8.6 Guiding Principle- Reliability and Completeness  
Many integrated reports prepared by entities are not balanced and serve more as a 
marketing exercise focusing on creating a good corporate image rather than providing a 
balanced report in relation to social, environmental and governance issues (Adams and 
Larrinaga-Gonzalez 2007; Tilt, 2001). Furthermore,  the lack of assurance over integrated 
reports is also a factor of concern given that investors and the broader group of 
stakeholders are more comfortable with and perceive greater reliance on assured reports 
on social and environmental issues and the like (Jones and Solomon, 2010; Atkins and 
Maroun, 2014). The IR Framework requires that an entity considers obtaining internal or 
external assurance over integrated reports as well as ensuring that there are adequate 
controls around the integrated reporting process (IIRC, 2013). Furthermore, an entity 
should present information in such a way that it will not unduly influence the basis of the 
preparation of the integrated report (IIRC, 2013). Information should present what it 
purports to represent either positively or negative depending on the matter and should not 
be presented to alter perception on the matter (IIRC, 2013). 
 
An example of how applying the IR frameworks requirements in respect of completeness 
for a state owned company can be seen in the integrated report by The New Zealand Post 
(Nkonki, 2015). The New Zealand Post‘s integrated report details the strategic assessment 
of the entity and the fact that it may impede the strategic plan of the entity  and as result 
negatively affect the capital available to it (Nkonki, 2015). 
 
In respect of presenting complete information, an entity should include all material 
information, positive and negative that is material and can affect value creation of the 
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entity (IIRC, 2013). Reporting on information which entities in the same industry report on 
can be used as a tool to ensure a complete representation is presented in the entity’s 
integrated report (IIRC, 2013). Furthermore, the cost versus benefit of presenting 
information should be considered when reporting on certain matters (IIRC, 2013). 
 
2.8.7 Guiding Principle- Consistency and Comparability 
The IR Framework requires that the integrated report prepared by an entity be consistent 
over time by reporting using the same reporting polices as the prior period and changing 
them only to improve the quality of reporting information (IIRC, 2013). When a change in 
policy is made, the reason for the change and its effects if any should be disclosed (IIRC, 
2013). In the interest of comparability between entities, an entity should consider 
benchmarking its reporting information to the reports of similar companies (IIRC, 2013). 
This will ensure that items that are usually reported on for that specific industry by means 
of ratios or other performance indicators are taken into account (IIRC, 2013). That said, 
entities are not required to conform in all aspects with the reporting requirement of other 
entities due to the fact that each entity derives values in different ways (IIRC, 2013).  
Rather the entities should use what is commonly reported on by other entities as a tool to 
report to address all the content elements per the IR Framework to ensure comparability 
(IIRC, 2013). As the performance of state owned entities is a concern for its stakeholders  
such as taxpayers (Hoque and Moll, 2001), using the tools that are set forth per the IR 
framework in respect of consistency and comparability will allow for taxpayers and 
stakeholders alike to compare and contrast the performance of the state owned company.  
The next section will look at the content elements that should be considered in the 
integrated report. 
2.8.8 Content Element- Organizational Overview and External Environment 
The IR Framework requires that an entity provides information as to what the company 
does and under which conditions these are undertaken (IIRC, 2013). The information 
includes identifying the vision and mission, values and ownership structure of the entity as 
well as the market forces that affect the entity (IIRC, 2013). These include Porters Five 
Forces that shape competitive strategy such as the bargaining power of customers and the 
competitive rivalry between entities which can affect value creation (Porter, 2008). The 
entity should also provide information as to the number of employees it employs as well as 
its areas of operation around the globe (IIRC, 2013). Significant changes in the entity 
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should also be documented and explained (IIRC, 2013). The external environment in 
which the entity operates in has an effect on the entity directly or indirectly and as a result 
affects value creation (IIRC, 2013). Factors of the external environment that affect an 
entity should thus be discussed in the integrated report of the entity in order to provide 
context as to the environment in which the entity operates in (IIRC, 2013). Use of the IR 
Framework in this regard can thus enable state owned companies to address factors that 
are of concern to a vast number of stakeholders who have an interest in their performance 
with context as to what their operations entail in the current market environment. 
2.8.9 Content Element- Governance  
Fraud scandals across the globe have increased the importance of corporate governance 
by ensuring that an entity is operated effectively and value is created (Bailey, Gramling 
and Ramamoorti, 2003). In state owned companies, poor corporate governance and the 
lack thereof can be blamed for poor performance and accountability (IOD and PWC, 2011; 
World Bank, 2007). The IR Framework requires disclosure in the integrated report of how 
corporate governance of the entity has assist in generating value in the short, medium and 
long-term (IIRC, 2013). This includes giving users of the entity’s integrated report 
information as to the leadership structure, composition and demographics, skills and 
experience of those charged with governance (IIRC, 2013). Furthermore, information as to 
whether the entity is in compliance with laws and regulations as well as where it has 
adopted rules and regulations in the interest of governance that go beyond what is 
required by law should be disclosed in the integrated report (IIRC, 2013). Lastly, the 
manner in which remuneration and incentives are structured to achieve the objectives of 
value creation not only in the short-term but in the long-term as well should be disclosed to 
determine if it supports value creation for the entity or not (IIRC, 2013).  
2.8.10 Content Element- Business Model 
“An organization’s business model is its system of transforming inputs, through its 
business activities, into outputs and outcomes that aims to fulfil the organization’s strategic 
purposes and create value over the short, medium and long-term” (IIRC, 2013:25). 
Business models are a powerful way to determine the strategic choices of an entity that 
may create value or destroy it (Shafer, Smith and Linder, 2005). According to Chesbrough 
and Rosenbloom (2002), “a successful business model creates a heuristic logic that 
connects technical potential with the realization of economic value”. In realising the 
importance that the business model of an entity plays in value creation, the IR Framework 
requires that an entity provides details of the business model in a simplistic yet effective 
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manner to describe the key material inputs (IIRC, 2013). A description should 
subsequently be made of how the entity adds value to these inputs through its business 
process (IIRC, 2013). The outputs of the business model both positive and negative 
should be detailed as well as the final outcome of what the business model seeks to 
achieve (IIRC, 2013). The business model can be depicted by means of using an 
illustration of the process to achieve its outcomes, in order to facilitate understanding for 
users (IIRC, 2013). Below is an example of an illustration used by Denel SOC Ltd to 
describe their business model. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Denel Business model illustration.  (Denel, 2015) 
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2.8.11 Content Element- Risk and Opportunities  
The lack of risk information disclosed by entities is a major concern as investors require 
risk information in order to make informed investment decisions (Cabedo and Tirado, 
2004). The IR Framework requires that an entity details those risks and opportunities 
internal or external, financial or non-financial that have the ability to affect value creation in 
the short, medium and long-term (IIRC, 2013). The IR framework also requires that an 
entity disclose how it plans to mitigate these risks and take advantage of opportunities 
(IIRC, 2013). Information on the above requirement may aid providers of finance who 
purchase bonds in state owned entities to better understand risks facing the entity and 
make informed investment decisions. 
2.8.12 Content Element- Strategy and Resource Allocation 
Stakeholders including providers of financial capital require information regarding the 
strategies and future objectives of an entity (Eurosif, 2009). State owned entities are in 
need of clear detailed strategies to help them achieve their principle objectives (KPMG, 
2012).  Integrated reports provide a comprehensive analysis of the value drivers of the 
entity and how they will assist an entity in achieving its objectives (Adams and Simnett. 
2011).  The IR framework requires that an entity detail what its objectives are for the short, 
medium and long-term as well as the strategies they have in place in order to achieve 
these objectives (IIRC, 2013). This includes describing how the entity will use its available 
resources to drive its strategy in order to accomplish its objectives (IIRC, 2013). 
Furthermore, the impact that a change in strategy has on the business model and 
resource allocation of the entity should be discussed (IIRC, 2013). 
2.8.13 Content Element- Performance  
Performance amongst state owned entities is of vital concern (IOD and PWC, 2011; World 
Bank, 2007). Stakeholders’ of entities in the current economic world require performance 
information on an entity that is holistic and not just about financial performance (Adams et 
al., 2011; Eurosif, 2009).  The IR Framework requires that an entity provides information to 
users of its integrated report about how the entity has performed in respect of achieving its 
strategic objectives in the current period and the effect this has had on the capitals 
available (IIRC, 2013). The IR Framework requires that an entity should report on both 
positive and negative performance (IIRC, 2013). Information on the entity’s performance 
should be both of a financial and non-financial nature (IIRC, 2013). This should ideally be 
presented by means of a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative information such as 
ratios and percentages (IIRC, 2013). Considering the fact that state owned entities must 
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balance profit and societal objectives (Luke, 2010), the requirements of the IR Framework 
may aid stakeholders understand the performance of an entity more clearly.   
2.8.14 Content Element- Outlook 
Shareholders including providers of financial capital are increasingly pursuing information 
regarding the future prospects of an entity (IIRC, 2013).  This is as a result of the changing 
economic climate that is currently being faced across the globe (IIRC, 2013). Given the 
increased need for accountability amongst state owned entities (KPMG, 2012), the IR 
Framework requires that an entity disclose in its integrated report, its expectations about 
the external environment in the short, medium and long-term (IIRC, 2013).  A description 
of how an entity is affected by the expectations of the future and its responses should be 
disclosed (IIRC, 2013). The future outlook and strategy of the business, the means of 
obtaining further capitals and utilising existing capitals to generate value should in essence 
be reported on (IIRC, 2013). This will depend largely on identified risks and opportunities 
which can be documented by means of using lead indicators where possible (IIRC, 2013). 
Care must be taken to ensure that the future outlook of the entity is realistic given the 
position and resources of the entity (IIRC, 2013). 
2.8.15 Content Element- Basis of Preparation and Presentation 
The IR Framework requires that an entity summarizes in its integrated report the process 
of determining if items are material and as such have been included in its integrated report 
(IIRC, 2013). Furthermore, the IR Framework requires that an entity provides a summary 
of the basis of how the reporting boundary of the integrated report is determined as well as 
a summary of the significant frameworks that are used in assessing and presenting 
material matters in the integrated report (IIRC, 2013). Luke (2010) found that stakeholders 
of state owned companies do not have an appropriate understanding of the reporting 
boundary. By following the IR Frameworks requirements in this regard, users of a state 
owned entity’s integrated report will have an understanding as to how the preparation and 
presentation was determined which can aid them in making appropriate decisions based 
on their reliance on those reports. 
2.8.16 Conclusion on IR Framework 
The World Bank and International Monetary fund found that there is a gap in reporting on 
risks and the future outlook of entities (IIRC, n.d). The need for accountability amongst 
state owned entities from their respective stakeholders have resulted in the need for an 
effective framework to address this need (KPMG, 2012). The IR framework was developed 
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in order to fill this gap with information which is required by an entity’s stakeholders (IIRC, 
n.d). As the aforementioned discussion, the IR Framework through its guiding principles 
and requirements for content element has effectively provided a framework to address this 
gap in information (IIRC, 2013). In addition, it is clear from that the IR Framework that its 
use in the preparation of an integrated report will in all likelihood provides stakeholders of 
state owned entities with valuable information which meets their needs and can assist 
them in making important decisions in respect of the entity. 
2.9 Conclusion 
As demonstrated in this chapter as well as by Chiu and Hung (2004) there has been very 
little research undertaken on the topic of accountability by state owned entities. The lack of 
accountability by state owned companies as discussed in this chapter is a major concern 
given the importance that state owned companies play in the economy (PWC, 2015). The 
increase in importance of accountability by state owned entities has been driven not only 
the importance of economic factors but also social and environmental considerations in the 
economy (Hoque and Moll, 2001). The lack of governance in relation to state owned 
entities has thus led to the mandates for which these entities are required to meet to be left 
unfulfilled (IOD and PWC, 2011). A mechanism to hold state owned entities accountable is 
thus required in order to improve performance, create value and improve governance in 
state owned entities (IOD and PWC, 2011; KPMG, 2012). As discussed in this chapter, 
integrated reporting can act as that mechanism to aid state owned companies in achieving 
accountability (KPMG, 2012). Furthermore, integrated reporting provides a comprehensive 
analysis of what the value drivers of an entity is and how an entity plans to leverage this 
going forward (Adams and Simnett, 2011). Integrated reporting thus provides a more 
holistic approach to reporting taking all the legitimate needs and interests of stakeholders 
into account (IOD, 2009), which traditional financial reporting fails to achieve due to its 
retrospective nature (Eurosif, 2009). Moreover, integrated reporting provides insight into 
the strategies of an entity (Eurosif, 2009) and can therefore satisfy the needs of state 
owned entities’ stakeholders more effectivity.  
The King III and the IR Frameworks use in state owned companies thus provide immense 
value as demonstrated in this chapter. Furthermore as the majority of South African state 
owned entities have adopted integrated reporting in terms of King III and the IR 
Framework (KPMG, 2012), evaluating the trends in integrated reporting by state owned 
entities would thus be a fruitful exercise. 
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This study thus seeks to identify the trends in integrated reporting by state owned entities 
over a three year period in line with the findings of the study conducted by Makiwane, 
(2012) which recommended that further research should thus be conducted on the trends 
integrated reporting by South African entities.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Research Methodology  
A quantitative research methodology was used to assess the extent of integrated reporting 
in state owned companies by means, of evaluating the trends in disclosures made in the 
integrated reports of state owned companies from the year 2013 to 2015. The research 
conducted takes the form of a descriptive study.  According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010) 
research of a descriptive nature purely seeks to explore an existing situation as opposed 
to altering the status quo. A quantitative research methodology includes testing objective 
theories by analysing the relationship between selected variables which can be measured 
(Creswell, 2013). For the purpose of this study data analysis is deductive, meaning that 
researchers deduce findings from the data collected in a manner which protects 
researchers from bias and allowing for general assumptions to be made (Creswell, 2013). 
This exploratory study encapsulates a qualitative methodology as the study seeks to 
evaluate the trends in the extent of integrated reporting undertaken by state owned 
companies per schedule 2 of the PFMA and not to alter the interested users or entities 
perceptions about the importance of integrated reporting.  
3.2 Research Design 
The study was conducted through inspection of annual reports and websites of state 
owned companies that are constituents of Schedule 2 of the PFMA for the 2013, 2014 and 
2015 financial years in order to review the trends in the integrated reports of each of the 
state owned companies identified. Where the 2015 financial year results were not 
available, the 2012, 2013 and 2014 financial years were examined. The reports were 
examined for disclosure relating to the King III and the IR Framework. This method of 
research forms part of Archival Research which involves the use of “administrative records 
and documents as a principle source of data. Archival research allows for research 
questions to focus on the historical data, which have subsequently changed over a period 
of time’’ (Saunders et al., 2009:177). 
The integrated report of each state owned company, the level of disclosure as well as 
details provided in each state owned company’s integrated report issued for the 2015 year 
was compared to the preceding two years (2014 and 2013) reports, in order to identify any 
changes in the extent of disclosure relating to the integrated reports prepared. 
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3.3 Research Population and Sample 
3.3.1 Population 
The population for this exploratory study is all of the state owned companies that form part 
of Schedule 2 of the PFMA. This consists of 21 companies in total. The PFMA lists state 
owned companies as either schedule 2 (21 companies) or schedule 3 (269 companies) 
companies. Schedule 2 companies are listed as the most important state owned 
companies in South Africa per PFMA whilst schedule 3 companies are listed as ‘other 
state owned entities’. As such given that this is an exploratory study it was imperative to 
use companies that form part of Schedule 2 of the PFMA in order to gain an understanding 
of the trends in integrated reporting in state owned. 
3.3.2 Sample and Sampling Method 
The selection of an appropriate sample size for a given population is a matter of 
calculation and judgement (Saunders et al., 2009). Where the population size of the data 
is less than 100, it is advisable to use the entire population (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). 
The larger the sample size used in proportion to the population the closer its distribution 
will be to the normal distribution per the central limit theory (Saunders et al., 2009). As 
such, according to Struley (2003) in order to carry out statistical analysis, a sample size 
should at minimum compromise of 30 items of data irrespective of the population size. 
Based on the aforementioned discussion as well as the fact that only Schedule 2 state 
owned companies per the PFMA will be analysed, the entire population of 21 state owned 
companies has been selected.  
3.4 The Research Instrument 
The research instrument adopted was a scorecard approach; where the requirements of 
King III and the IR Framework was recorded and scored against the disclosure contained 
in the various state owned companies’ integrated reports (refer to Annexure A for details of 
the indicators utilised). It is recognized that the use of a checklist is not in the spirit of 
integrated reporting as it encourages a ‘tick-box’ approach. However this method provided 
for consistency in carrying out the required testing of the research.  
The information disclosed as per the guidance and principles set forth by the King III and 
the IR Framework was analysed using a rating scale adapted from the study conducted by 
Makiwane (2012) as indicated in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Rating scale  
SCORE INDICATOR Classification 
1 The report provides no information on the 
requirement.  
(Non-compliance) 
2 The report provides a small amount of details/ 
information on the requirement. 
(Poor/average) 
3 The report provides satisfactory details/ 
information on the requirement.  
(Satisfactory) 
4 The report provides more details/ information on 
the requirement.  
(Good) 
5 The report provides a large amount of details/ 
information on the requirement.  
(Excellent) 
 
3.5 Procedure for Data Collection 
A list of state owned companies that are constituents of Schedule 2 of the PFMA for the 
years 2015, 2014 and 2013 respectively was obtained from the National Treasury website. 
Thereafter, the annual reports/integrated reports of each constituent were downloaded 
from the respective state owned company’s website. 
The websites and reports were reviewed and scrutinized by the researcher in order to 
determine the extent of detail reported on in each company’s integrated report per King III 
and the IR Framework using the rating scale (refer to Table 3.1) for each state owned 
company.  
3.6 Validity and Reliability 
White (2003:25) described that “validity is concerned with the idea that the research 
design fully addresses the questions and objectives aimed to be achieved. Reliability is 
about consistency and research, and whether another researcher could use the design 
and obtain similar findings”. This study conforms to the above statement, as it uses the 
annual reports of state owned companies. The benefit of using these reports is that it 
consists of audited financial statements. As such the auditor of the company would per the 
International Standards on Auditing 720, examine information contained in the annual 
report that may contradict information contained in the audited financial statements 
(IAASB, 2011). The information contained in the annual reports can thus be regarded as a 
reliable source of information and regarded as valid and reliable. 
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It must be noted that the assessment of the extent of reporting involves a level of 
subjectivity. Subjectivity in itself however, does not to lead to the threat that the validity and 
reliability of a study will be compromised (Unerman, 2009).  Acknowledgment of the fact 
that a level of subjectivity is involved in this study and including a description of the 
analysis process in a complete and transparent manner; an in depth analysis for which 
traditional scientific methods cannot provide is made (Elo and Kyngas, 2008; Unerman, 
2009) As a result, the researcher’s consistency was relied upon in order to deliver 
dependable results in a fair, just and equitable manner. 
3.7 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
The statistical analysis for this report was completed by a statistical consultant at the 
University of the Witwatersrand. By evaluating the frequency and multiple bar graphs of 
the indicators, descriptive statistics were used. Furthermore, a non-parametric test was 
utilized to assess for any significant differences in the extent of disclosure from the year 
2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively. The use of non-parametric data is valuable when data 
is of a qualitative nature as it is objective to the population of the data thus making it an 
appropriate tool to aid in decision making circumstances (Hanke and Reitsch, 1994). 
The non-parametric Spearman’s rho was used to determine whether there is a monotonic 
relationship between each company’s overall (across all indicators) disclosure scores for 
the years 2013, 2014 and 2015. High correlation between two years is an indication that, 
on average, the companies tend to follow the same pattern of reporting disclosure from the 
one year to the next (Saunders et al., 2009). On the other hand, low correlation is an 
indication that the companies, on average, changed their pattern of reporting disclosure 
considerably from the one year to the next (Saunders et al., 2009). However, the 
correlations do not indicate whether the companies disclosed at a higher or lower level 
from one year to the next (Saunders et al., 2009).  
To establish whether there is a difference in the level at which companies disclosed from 
one year to the next, the mean disclosure level scores for the three years are compared 
using repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is 
a statistical method to test to the difference in group means. This is used when there is 
one parametric dependent variable and one or more independent variable (Sawyer, 2009). 
Due to the non-normality of the level scores, the non-parametric equivalent of the 
parametric repeated measures ANOVA, the Friedman Test. The Friedman test is used to 
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test the null hypothesis that assumes that the difference between any pair of mean 
disclosure rank values for the three years is zero (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Mean scores and the differences were used in this report in order to determine on average 
whether the state owned companies, analysed displayed any improvement in the level of 
their reporting disclosure as per Makiwane (2012). The mean is used to determine the 
central position of a distribution, simply called the average (Kohler and Kreuter, 2005). The 
use of mean scores is appropriate as it provides information as to whether the pattern of 
integrated reporting disclosure that is observed is due to an improvement in disclosure or 
not (Makiwane, 2012). Where a state owned company’s mean score increases from the 
prior year, this indicates an improvement in the level of reporting by the entity and vice 
versa. The magnitude as such of the improvement can thus be quantified by the use of 
mean scores. 
In line with the study conducted by Makiwane (2012) this report did not make use of 
standard deviations, variances and standard errors due to the non-normality of the data 
analysed. The marginal standard deviation differences observed in this study also 
contributed to this decision.  
3.8 Limitations of the Study 
Where the integrated report of a particular state owned company is not available for 2015 
year as it has not yet been released, this report evaluated the trends in integrated 
reporting by state owned companies over the 2012, 2013 and 2014 financial years. 
The study was limited to state owned companies based in South Africa per schedule 2 of 
the PFMA. A further limitation included that only 19 out of the 21 companies were 
analysed per Schedule 2 of the PFMA, as 2 state owned companies could not provide 
integrated reports for all three financial years.  
3.9 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter explained the different aspects of the research methodology, 
design and data collection. This study was conducted by means of using a quantitative 
research methodology due to the descriptive nature of the study which aimed to identify 
the trends in integrated reporting by state owned companies over a three year period. In 
order to conduct the analysis of the trends in integrated reporting by state owned 
companies, the annual/integrated reports of each state owned entity selected for analysis 
were obtained. Furthermore, a scorecard approach was used to score the disclosures 
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made by each state owned company against the requirement of King III and the IR 
Framework. Non-parametric tests have been used to ascertain and determine the 
statistical significance of the results by means of bar graphs, tables and means scores by 
each state owned company for disclosure per King III and the IR Framework. The following 
chapter details the analysis of the results using the research methodology and design as 
detailed in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the trends in integrated reporting by state 
owned companies over a three year period. Firstly, this chapter identifies whether  there 
was a pattern in reporting disclosures on an overall basis for the entities analysed followed 
by a discussion as to the level of integrated reporting observed for the state owned entities 
analysed. 
Furthermore, a discussion on the trends in integrated reporting based on the subsections 
of the research indicators used in this report which are based on the Chapters of the King 
III report and the IR Framework elements will ensue.  This will provide a clear depiction as 
to the areas of the integrated report for which reporting by state owned entities has been 
improving, declining or stagnating. Lastly, this chapter provides an overview of the overall 
trends in integrated reporting by state owned entities.  
4.2 Patterns in Reporting Disclosure   
Spearman’s rho (rs) was used to determine whether there is a monotonic relationship 
between the state owned companies’ overall (across all indicators) disclosure scores for 
the years 2013, 2014 and 2015 in respect of integrated reporting. As explained in chapter 
3 of the research methodology, a high correlation between two years is an indication that, 
on average, the state owned companies tend to follow the same pattern of reporting 
disclosure from the one year to the next (Saunders et al., 2009). On the other hand, low 
correlation is an indication that the companies, on average, changed their pattern of 
reporting disclosure considerably from the one year to the next. 
The disclosures from 2013 to 2014 (rs=0.672) on average appear to follow largely the 
same pattern and same can be said about the disclosures from the year 2014 to 2015 
(rs=0.726). It can therefore be deduced that on average, there is a strong positive pattern 
of reporting disclosures from the 2013 to 2014 period and the 2014 to 2015 period. 
However the results do not provide information as to how the level of integrated reporting 
changed year on year for each of the state owned companies analysed. A further 
discussion of the change in the level of integrated reporting is provided in the section 
below using the Friedman’s Test.  
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4.3 Changes in the Level of Integrated Reporting By State Owned Companies over 
the Three Year Period Analysed  
To establish whether there is a difference in the level at which companies disclosed from 
one year to the next, the mean disclosure level scores for the three years were compared 
using repeated measures ANOVA by means of the Friedman’s Test. 
The Friedman’s test found that, at the 1% level of significance, the null hypothesis can be 
rejected and thus that there is a statistically significant difference between the mean ranks, 
Chi-square (2) = 21.895, p<.01, of at least one pair of mean disclosure rank values. 
By investigating the descriptive statistics in Table 4.1 below, it is evident that the mean 
disclosure level scores increased from 2013 to 2014, from 2013 to 2015 and from 2014 to 
2015. However, to determine which of these differences (increases) are statistically 
significant; an error bar chart was used to compare the 95% confidence intervals (CI’s) for 
each of the disclosure level scores for 2013, 2014 and 2015 (Figure 4.1). As the Standard 
Deviation (SD) variation in the 2015 year scores are greater (SD=0.672) than the 2013 
(SD=2.550) and 2014 year’s (SD=2.996) scores, there was less precision and 
consequently, the 95% CI is wider for the 2013 and 2014 years’ scores. The 2013 mean 
score differs significantly from both the 2014 and 2015 mean scores since there is no 
overlap between the CI of the 2013 mean score and that of 2014 and 2015. However, due 
to the overlap in the 95% CI’s for 2014 and 2015, one cannot assume that the observed 
mean score increase from 2014 to 2015 is statistically significant.  This can be due to the 
fact that the mean differences observed from 2014 to 2015 were not very large. 
Table 4.1: Results of the Friedman Test (Descriptive Statistics) 
Score per 
Year 
Number of 
companies  
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
2013 19 2.5496 0.46367 1.93 3.42 
2014 19 2.9962 0.46148 2.07 3.85 
2015 19 3.3454 0.67223 1.92 4.28 
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Figure 4.1 Diagram representing 95% Confidence intervals over the 2013, 2014 and 2015 
periods 
In conclusion, the level of integrated reporting by state owned companies from the 2013 
period to 2014, increased and is statistically significant. Furthermore, the level of 
integrated reporting by state owned companies over the 2013 to 2015 period also 
increased and was statistically significant as discussion above. The level of integrated 
reporting from the 2014 to 2015 period for state owned companies also increased 
however; the Friedman’s used in this report was unable to determine if this increase was 
statistically significant.  
4.4 Evaluating the Trends in Integrated Reporting Per Subcategory of Indicators 
This section will identify the overall mean scores for each subcategory of indicators used in 
this report and provide insight into the trends in reporting by state owned companies based 
on each subcategory of indicators. 
Table 4.2 below lists the average mean scores for each subcategory over the 2013, 2014 
and 2015 reporting period. Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 reveals these scores in order to 
visualize the trends identified more effectively.  
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Table 4.2: Average Score Comparisons Across The Three Year Period Analysed. 
 
 
2013 2014 2015
1 Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship 19 2.8737 3.3474 3.6105
2 Boards and directors 19 3.1989 3.4437 3.6566
3 Audit Committees 19 3.3746 3.5418 3.8762
4 Risk management committee 19 3.1914 3.6077 3.8517
5 Remuneration committee 19 3.2842 3.4737 3.7263
6 Nomination committee 19 2.4737 2.7632 2.9474
7 Internal audit function 19 2.9415 3.1988 3.2865
8 Governance of information technology 19 1.4649 1.807 2.5
9 Compliance laws, rules, codes and standards 19 2.7719 3.2982 3.6842
10 Governing stakeholder relationships 19 2.2632 3 3.3947
11 Integrated reporting King III 19 2.2719 2.7632 3.0526
12 Organizational overview and external environment 19 3.0526 3.7719 3.9123
13 Governance 19 1.7368 2.3684 2.7368
14 Business Model 19 2.4105 2.7263 3.1158
15 Risks and opportunities 19 2.3684 3 3.6842
16 Strategy and resource allocation 19 2.4737 3.3684 3.7368
17 Performance 19 3.0263 3.6842 4.0263
18 Outlook 19 1.9474 2.2895 2.7105
19 Basis of preparation 19 1.3158 1.4737 2.0526
Total 361 2.5496 2.9962 3.3454
Mean Per Year
Statistical Value
Number of 
Companies
Higher Classification Per higher level indicator 
classification
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Figure 4.2: Diagram representing the Average scores per indicator  
Refer to legend on the next page. 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S
2013 2.8737 3.1989 3.3746 3.1914 3.2842 2.4737 2.9415 1.4649 2.7719 2.2632 2.2719 3.0526 1.7368 2.4105 2.3684 2.4737 3.0263 1.9474 1.3158
2014 3.3474 3.4437 3.5418 3.6077 3.4737 2.7632 3.1988 1.8070 3.2982 3.0000 2.7632 3.7719 2.3684 2.7263 3.0000 3.3684 3.6842 2.2895 1.4737
2015 3.6105 3.6566 3.8762 3.8517 3.7263 2.9474 3.2865 2.5000 3.6842 3.3947 3.0526 3.9123 2.7368 3.1158 3.6842 3.7368 4.0263 2.7105 2.0526
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Legend refers to Figure 4.2: 
Indicators 
Term Description Team  Description 
A Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship K Integrated reporting per King III 
B Board and Directors L Organizational overview and external environment 
C Audit Committees M Governance 
D Risk management Committee N Business model 
E Remuneration Committee O Risks and opportunities 
F Nomination Committee P Strategy and resource allocation 
G Internal audit function Q Performance 
H Governance of information technology R Outlook 
I Compliance laws, riles codes and standards S Basis of preparation 
J Governing stakeholder relationships   
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Figure 4.3: An alternative representation of the average scores per sub category over the three year period analysed 
 
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
2013 2014 2015
Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship Boards and directors Audit Comittees
Risk management committee Remuneration committee Nomination committee
Internal audit function Governance of information technology Compliance laws, rules, codes and standards
Governing stakeholder relationships Integrated reporting King III Organizational overview and external environment
Governance Business Model Risks and opportunities
Strategy and resource allocation Performance Outlook
Basis of preparation Total
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In order to obtain information as to the percentage of companies that reported on 
each of the subcategory of indicators under the different levels of disclosure possible 
per the scorecard rating scale. As evidenced by Table 4.2 the mean average score 
was reclassified as detailed below, in order to generate the data in Table 4.3 that 
follows.  
The mean scores calculated for each company across all indicators was reclassified 
as follows per the rating scale adopted from the study conducted by Makiwane 
(2012) (refer to Table 3.1): (square bracket  includes value, round bracket  
excludes value) 
 1 if the mean score falls in [1, 1.5) 
 2 if the mean score falls in [1.5, 2.5) 
 3 if the mean score falls in [2.5, 3.5) 
 4 if the mean score falls in [3.5, 4.5) 
 5 if the mean score falls in [5.5, 5] 
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Table 4.3: The percentage of state owned companies that reported on each 
subcategory of indicators and the levels of disclosure the companies scored on 
average. 
 
 
Higher 
Classification 
  Statistical Value 
Score 
 per 
year 
1 2 3 4 5 
Total 
  
  
Non-
compl
iance 
Little 
detail 
provide
d 
Some 
detail 
provi
ded 
More 
detail 
provid
ed 
Much 
detail 
provid
ed 
1 
Ethical leadership 
and corporate 
citizenship 
2013 
1 2 14 2 0 19 
5.30% 10.50% 73.70% 10.50% 0.00% 100.00% 
2014 
0 0 14 5 0 19 
0.00% 0.00% 73.70% 26.30% 0.00% 100.00% 
2015 
1 0 6 11 1 19 
5.30% 0.00% 31.60% 57.90% 5.30% 100.00% 
2 
Boards and 
directors 
2013 
0 3 8 8 0 19 
0.00% 15.80% 42.10% 42.10% 0.00% 100.00% 
2014 
0 1 10 7 1 19 
0.00% 5.30% 52.60% 36.80% 5.30% 100.00% 
2015 
0 1 6 11 1 19 
0.00% 5.30% 31.60% 57.90% 5.30% 100.00% 
3 Audit Committees 
2013 
0 1 13 4 1 19 
0.00% 5.30% 68.40% 21.10% 5.30% 100.00% 
2014 
0 0 9 9 1 19 
0.00% 0.00% 47.40% 47.40% 5.30% 100.00% 
2015 
0 0 5 10 4 19 
0.00% 0.00% 26.30% 52.60% 21.10% 100.00% 
4 
Risk management 
committee 
2013 
0 0 14 5 0 19 
0.00% 0.00% 73.70% 26.30% 0.00% 100.00% 
2014 
0 1 6 11 1 19 
0.00% 5.30% 31.60% 57.90% 5.30% 100.00% 
2015 
0 1 5 10 3 19 
0.00% 5.30% 26.30% 52.60% 15.80% 100.00% 
5 
Remuneration 
committee 
2013 
1 1 9 6 2 19 
5.30% 5.30% 47.40% 31.60% 10.50% 100.00% 
2014 
2 0 8 5 4 19 
10.50% 0.00% 42.10% 26.30% 21.10% 100.00% 
2015 
1 1 5 8 4 19 
5.30% 5.30% 26.30% 42.10% 21.10% 100.00% 
6 
Nomination 
committee 
2013 
5 4 4 4 2 19 
26.30% 21.10% 21.10% 21.10% 10.50% 100.00% 
2014 
5 4 2 2 6 19 
26.30% 21.10% 10.50% 10.50% 31.60% 100.00% 
2015 
4 3 3 4 5 19 
21.10% 15.80% 15.80% 21.10% 26.30% 100.00% 
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Higher 
Classification 
  Statistical Value 
Score 
 per 
year 
1 2 3 4 5 
Total 
  
  
Non-
compl
iance 
Little 
detail 
provide
d 
Some 
detail 
provi
ded 
More 
detail 
provid
ed 
Much 
detail 
provid
ed 
7 
Internal audit 
function 
2013 
0 7 8 4 0 19 
0.00% 36.80% 42.10% 21.10% 0.00% 100.00% 
2014 
0 4 7 8 0 19 
0.00% 21.10% 36.80% 42.10% 0.00% 100.00% 
2015 
0 2 9 7 1 19 
0.00% 10.50% 47.40% 36.80% 5.30% 100.00% 
8 
Governance of 
information 
technology 
2013 
8 11 0 0 0 19 
42.10% 57.90% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
2014 
7 8 3 1 0 19 
36.80% 42.10% 15.80% 5.30% 0.00% 100.00% 
2015 
4 7 4 1 3 19 
21.10% 36.80% 21.10% 5.30% 15.80% 100.00% 
9 
Compliance laws, 
rules, codes and 
standards 
2013 
2 8 3 5 1 19 
10.50% 42.10% 15.80% 26.30% 5.30% 100.00% 
2014 
1 3 7 6 2 19 
5.30% 15.80% 36.80% 31.60% 10.50% 100.00% 
2015 
0 3 5 8 3 19 
0.00% 15.80% 26.30% 42.10% 15.80% 100.00% 
10 
Governing 
stakeholder 
relationships 
2013 
4 7 3 5 0 19 
21.10% 36.80% 15.80% 26.30% 0.00% 100.00% 
2014 
1 5 5 5 3 19 
5.30% 26.30% 26.30% 26.30% 15.80% 100.00% 
2015 
1 2 7 4 5 19 
5.30% 10.50% 36.80% 21.10% 26.30% 100.00% 
11 
Integrated 
reporting King III 
2013 
0 10 9 0 0 19 
0.00% 52.60% 47.40% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
2014 
0 6 10 3 0 19 
0.00% 31.60% 52.60% 15.80% 0.00% 100.00% 
2015 
0 4 8 7 0 19 
0.00% 21.10% 42.10% 36.80% 0.00% 100.00% 
12 
 Organizational 
overview and 
external 
environment 
2013 
1 4 6 8 0 19 
5.30% 21.10% 31.60% 42.10% 0.00% 100.00% 
2014 
0 1 5 11 2 19 
0.00% 5.30% 26.30% 57.90% 10.50% 100.00% 
2015 
1 0 4 10 4 19 
5.30% 0.00% 21.10% 52.60% 21.10% 100.00% 
13 Governance 
2013 
9 7 2 1 0 19 
47.40% 36.80% 10.50% 5.30% 0.00% 100.00% 
2014 
4 7 5 3 0 19 
21.10% 36.80% 26.30% 15.80% 0.00% 100.00% 
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Higher 
Classification 
  Statistical Value 
Score 
 per 
year 
1 2 3 4 5 
Total 
  
  
Non-
compl
iance 
Little 
detail 
provide
d 
Some 
detail 
provi
ded 
More 
detail 
provid
ed 
Much 
detail 
provid
ed 
2015 
3 5 6 4 1 19 
15.80% 26.30% 31.60% 21.10% 5.30% 100.00% 
14 Business Model 
2013 
2 10 4 3 0 19 
10.50% 52.60% 21.10% 15.80% 0.00% 100.00% 
2014 
0 11 4 3 1 19 
0.00% 57.90% 21.10% 15.80% 5.30% 100.00% 
2015 
0 7 5 5 2 19 
0.00% 36.80% 26.30% 26.30% 10.50% 100.00% 
15 
Risks and 
opportunities 
2013 
7 5 1 5 1 19 
36.80% 26.30% 5.30% 26.30% 5.30% 100.00% 
2014 
3 4 5 4 3 19 
15.80% 21.10% 26.30% 21.10% 15.80% 100.00% 
2015 
3 2 2 3 9 19 
15.80% 10.50% 10.50% 15.80% 47.40% 100.00% 
16 
Strategy and 
resource 
allocation 
2013 
1 9 8 1 0 19 
5.30% 47.40% 42.10% 5.30% 0.00% 100.00% 
2014 
0 3 7 8 1 19 
0.00% 15.80% 36.80% 42.10% 5.30% 100.00% 
2015 
0 3 4 7 5 19 
0.00% 15.80% 21.10% 36.80% 26.30% 100.00% 
17 Performance 
2013 
0 4 8 4 3 19 
0.00% 21.10% 42.10% 21.10% 15.80% 100.00% 
2014 
0 1 7 5 6 19 
0.00% 5.30% 36.80% 26.30% 31.60% 100.00% 
2015 
0 0 4 6 9 19 
0.00% 0.00% 21.10% 31.60% 47.40% 100.00% 
18 
Outlook 
 
 
 
2013 
3 10 3 2 1 19 
15.80% 52.60% 15.80% 10.50% 5.30% 100.00% 
2014 
2 8 7 2 0 19 
10.50% 42.10% 36.80% 10.50% 0.00% 100.00% 
2015 
3 5 5 3 3 19 
15.80% 
 
26.30% 
 
26.30% 
 
15.80% 
 
15.80% 
 
100.00% 
 
19 
Basis of 
preparation 
2013 
16 2 0 0 1 19 
84.20% 10.50% 0.00% 0.00% 5.30% 100.00% 
2014 
14 3 0 2 0 19 
73.70% 15.80% 0.00% 10.50% 0.00% 100.00% 
2015 
11 3 0 3 2 19 
57.90% 15.80% 0.00% 15.80% 10.50% 100.00% 
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The scores per the subcategories of indicators as detailed in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 
will now be analysed per each subcategory, in order to obtain an in depth 
understanding of the trends in reporting by state owned companies. Where mention 
is made of an individual indicator within the subcategory analysis to follow, the 
results for each individual indicator can be found in Annexure B. 
4.4.1 Ethical Leadership and Corporate Citizenship  
The disclosure made by state owned companies in relation to ethical leadership and 
corporate citizenship category improved year on year with a general upward trend.  
As evident in Table 4.2, the mean score for this category resulted as 2.8737 for 2013 
which suggests that the disclosure made by state owned companies in regards to 
ethical leadership and corporate citizenship was average in that period. This could 
be attributable to the fact that state owned companies adopted integrated reporting 
much later than companies in the private sector (PWC, 2015). However, the level of 
reporting subsequently improved to a satisfactory to good standard in 2014 and 
2015. Therefore it can be deduced that there is an upward trend which suggests that 
future improvements in regard to this aspect can be expected.  
An interesting fact is that of the percentage of companies analysed, on average 73.7 
percent of state owned companies reported on indicators in this subcategory based 
on a level 3 disclosure in both 2013 and 2014, as indicated in Figure 4.4. This 
subsequently dropped in 2015 to 31.6 percent but led to the percentage of 
companies that reported on a level 4 disclosure to increase significantly from 10.5 
percent in 2013 and 26.3 percent in 2014, to 57.9 percent in 2015 per Table 4.3. 
This indicated that there was an increasing trend in the number of state owned 
companies that provide greater disclosure in an effective manner for ethical 
leadership and corporate citizenship issues which may be due to the realisation by 
state owned companies that governance needs to be driven from the top down in 
order to be effective in an entity. 
The percentage of companies who have had their ethics internally or externally 
assured has gradually increased. This is in line with the need of stakeholders to have 
non-financial information independently assured (Atkins and Maroun, 2012). 
Although the increases are minimal a greater portion of entities are reporting at a 
level 3 disclosure (15, 8% in 2015). 
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In line with the need to disclosure more information on company strategy and vision 
(KPMG, 2012), it was observed that across all the three years the majority of the 
companies analysed reported on a level 5 disclosure with 17 out of the 19 
companies doing so in 2015. 
 
Figure 4.4: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on ethical leadership and corporate citizenship based on the different levels of 
disclosure. 
4.4.2 Board and Directors 
The increase in disclosure by state owned companies in relation to items 
surrounding the board and directors was marginal. Disclosure in relation to this 
category remained satisfactory over all three years analysed with a mean score of 
3.6566 observed in 2015 per Table 4.2.  
The majority of state owned companies analysed disclosed a satisfactory or good 
amount of information in relation to the governance of the board and directors per 
Table 4.3. The percentage of companies that disclosed information relating to this 
subcategory at a level 4 increased on from 36.8 percent in 2014 to 57.9 percent in 
2015, (Figure 4.5) which was significant. This suggests that the drive to improve 
corporate governance within boards has been a matter of key importance that state 
owned companies have attempted to address effectively given that there is 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 5.3% 10.5% 73.7% 10.5% 0.0%
2014 0.0% 0.0% 73.7% 26.3% 0.0%
2015 5.3% 0.0% 31.6% 57.9% 5.3%
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increased scrutiny on the management of state owned companies. Only one 
company reported at a level 5 for this subcategory in 2015 which suggests that there 
is still room for improvement. 
The disclosure as to the number of independent non-executive directors that are 
appointed to the board of state owned companies increased significantly. Which 
could that the need to appoint independent directors to the board of an entity in order 
to ensure a balanced equitable control of the board (IOD, 2009) has been an agenda 
that has been actively addressed by state owned entities due to the increased drive 
in the public services sector for independence in mind and appearance. A major 
increase was also seen in the training and on-going development of directors. This is 
a step in the right direction given that director experience and skills can affect 
shareholder value (IIRC, 2013). An issue of concern is that disclosure relating to the 
remuneration of directors and the three highest paid employees is still not widely 
reported on. Those who do report provide mostly average or satisfactory disclosure 
in respect of remuneration of directors and senior management. This is a concern 
given the increased scrutiny surrounding the compensation of executive and non-
executive directors of state owned companies who receive large bonuses but do not 
deliver performance for the company. 
Another area that is concerning is that disclosure in regard to the policies in place for 
the retirement and appointment of directors is very low over all three years analysed 
and is in fact deteriorating. In the year 2015, 57.9 percent of state owned companies 
provided disclosure in regards to this indicator on a level 1 and 2 base which suggest 
that this is an area that needs reform due to the poor or often non-disclosure in this 
regard. This is a concern firstly due to the fact that it does not shed light on continuity 
in effective management by the board as well as may raise concerns of whether 
appointments to the board are manipulated in favour of certain individuals. 
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Figure 4.5: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on board and directors based on the different levels of disclosure. 
 
4.4.3 Audit Committees 
Disclosure in relation to the audit committee fared well with an upward overall trend 
and a mean score of 3.8517 for 2015 which suggests that state owned companies 
disclosures in relation to audit committees are closer to providing a good disclosure 
on audit committee disclosures rather than satisfactory disclosure as in the past. 
Furthermore, not one state owned company reported on average at a level 1 
disclosure overall in all three years analysed for this subcategory, as indicated in 
Figure 4.6. Disclosure in relation to the appointment of the audit committee is 
excellent. The majority of entities reported on a level 5 disclosure in this regard with 
on average 84.2 percent of companies disclosing at this level in 2015. 
Information relating to the independence of directors and the chairman of the audit 
who serve on the audit committee was also of a high level with majority of entities 
disclosing information in this regard at a level 5. What is interesting is that these 
requirements for disclosure are mandated by the Companies Act. Therefore a 
question can be proposed, if the high level of disclosure in respect of items relating 
to the audit committee are as a result of mandatory compliance that is required per 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 0.0% 15.8% 42.1% 42.1% 0.0%
2014 0.0% 5.3% 52.6% 36.8% 5.3%
2015 0.0% 5.3% 31.6% 57.9% 5.3%
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the Companies Act or due to the adoption of the recommendations of King III. A 
further positive in relation to the audit committee is that audit committee meetings 
overall have a high attendance and occur regularly. Hence, the duties of the audit 
committee appear to have been carried out far more effectively from this as a result 
of the overall favourable scores achieved in this subcategory of disclosure. This 
confirms the theory of Gendron and Bedard (2006), in relation to the impact that 
effective audit committee meetings have on an audit committees duties. 
Areas of concern that should be addressed in relation to the audit committee include 
that greater disclosure is required about how the audit committee oversees the 
effectiveness of the financial function as well as if a combined assurance model is 
being applied, as this is currently below average. This will aid state owned 
companies who historically have had issues relating to their finance functions.  A 
major concern is that disclosure relation to the audit committee’s responsibility to 
oversee the preparation of the integrated report was dismal with on average 21.1 
percent of companies not disclosing any information in this regard and 31.6 percent 
of state owned companies providing poor discourse on this matter. This area of 
disclosure should be addressed at the soonest in the interest of good corporate 
governance by state owned companies. 
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Figure 4.6 Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on the audit committee based on the different levels of disclosure. 
 
4.4.4 Risk Management Committee 
There was an increasing trend observed in the disclosure of risks and the function 
that the risk management committee performs in relation to risks. The mean score 
achieved for 2015 was up to 3.8517 (per Figure 4.2.) from 3.6077 and 3.1914 in 
2014 and 2013 respectively. This advocates that as the call for greater information to 
be disclosed on an entity’s risk is made (IIRC, 2013) state owned companies have 
steadily observed this call realising the effect risk has on value creation.  
The composition of risk committee is well documented with on average 73.7 percent 
of state owned companies disclosing information on this matter at level 5. Many 
concerns are still present in relation to the identification and mitigation of risks. It was 
found that although decreasing year on year, on average 10.5 percent of state 
owned companies analysed did not identify and disclose their financial and non-
financial risks. However, this does not mean that risk disclosure is weak in state 
owned companies given that on average 68.5 percent of state owned companies 
identified ways to address their financial and non-financial risk in 2015 at level 4 or 5, 
up from 42.1 percent in 2014. The reason for this increase could be due to the   
1 2 3 4 5
2013 0.0% 5.3% 68.4% 21.1% 5.3%
2014 0.0% 0.0% 47.4% 47.4% 5.3%
2015 0.0% 0.0% 26.3% 52.6% 21.1%
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greater need for disclosure on risks facing state owned entities given their poor 
performance and prospectus of late. The views expressed by the risk committee on 
the effectiveness of an entity’s risk management process also had a similar result 
observed. Seven companies reported at a level 5 in 2014 compared to 1 in 2013 and 
only 2 companies had no disclosure on this indicator which was an improvement 
from 7 who provided no disclosure in 2013. Figure 4.7 below clearly depicts the 
increasing level of disclosures adopted by a wider array of state owned companies. 
 
Figure 4.7 Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on the risk management based on the different levels of disclosure. 
4.4.5 Remuneration Committee 
Disclosure on the remuneration committee’s function was observed to be generally 
satisfactory and followed a steady upward trend with the mean scores from 2013 
increasing by 0.1895 to 2014 and 0.2526 from 2014 to 2015 per Table 4.2.  The 
reason for the slow-moving increase in disclosure can be attributable to the fact that 
the remuneration committee function appears to be a developing function within 
state owned companies. The reason for this is that a large proportion of state owned 
companies do not apply its principles in relation to having the committee chaired by 
an independent director. On average 19.5 percent in 2015 and 21.1 percent in both 
2014 and 2015 did not disclose information on whether the remuneration or another 
committee determined directors’ compensation.  This is a major concern given the 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 0.0% 0.0% 73.7% 26.3% 0.0%
2014 0.0% 5.3% 31.6% 57.9% 5.3%
2015 0.0% 5.3% 26.3% 52.6% 15.8%
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often inflated compensation of state owned company directors who do not perform 
effectively in delivering entity performance. Figure 4.8 below illustrates the 
percentage of state owned companies that on average reported disclosures at the 
different disclosure levels for this subcategory. 
 
Figure 4.8: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on the remuneration committee based on the different levels of disclosure. 
4.4.6 Nomination Committee 
Disclosure made in respect of the nomination committee still requires improvement. 
Although the mean score achieved improved from 2.737 in 2013 to 2.9474 in 2015, 
the disclosure was still poor to average in this regard.  As evident from Figure 4.9, 
the number of companies that did not comply with this requirement remained the 
same from 2013 to 2014 at 26.3 percent but thereafter decreased to 21.1 percent on 
average in 2015. Therefore, it is deduced that this is an item that state owned 
companies are battling to grasp effectively. This may be one of the reasons that 
there is a lack of information on director appointment and retirement procedures as 
discussed above. Once more, the composition or lack thereof of this committee 
seems to have an effect on the remainder of the functions that the nomination 
committee is expected to meet. 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 5.3% 5.3% 47.4% 31.6% 10.5%
2014 10.5% 0.0% 42.1% 26.3% 21.1%
2015 5.3% 5.3% 26.3% 42.1% 21.1%
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Figure 4.9: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on the nomination committee based on the different levels of disclosure. 
4.4.7 Internal Audit Function 
The improvement in disclosure relating to the IAF is on an upward trend however, 
the improvement seen from 2014 to 2015 of an increase in the mean score of 0.0877 
is far less than the improvement from 2013 to 2014 of 0.2573 (Table 4.2). 
An analysis of Figure 4.10 indicates that the majority of state owned companies 
disclosed satisfactory to good information for the IAF. Furthermore, there were no 
state owned company that did not comply with this disclosure.  
An  Issue which is of concern is that from the integrated reports analysed on average 
10.5 percent of state owned companies in 2015 had no information as to whether the 
IAF reports to  the audit committee. This is an improvement though from the average 
of 21.1 percent of state owned companies that did not comply with this requirement 
in 2013 and 2014. This suggests that there are still serious issues in relation to the 
line of communication in respect of the IAF and the board in some entities however, 
on average 84.2 percent of state owned companies provided excellent disclosure in 
this regard, up from 68.4 percent in 2014.  
1 2 3 4 5
2013 26.3% 21.1% 21.1% 21.1% 10.5%
2014 26.3% 21.1% 10.5% 10.5% 31.6%
2015 21.1% 15.8% 15.8% 21.1% 26.3%
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Another area of concern is that there is a lack of disclosure on whether a CAE is 
appointed to head up the IAF with on average 42.1 percent of state owned 
companies analysed, not providing disclosure on this matter in 2015. Again it does 
seem that this is being addressed by state owned companies given that non-
compliance with this requirement has decreased to 42.1 percent from 47.4 percent in 
2014. However, this is slower than the decrease in non-compliance from 2013 to 
2014 which decreased from 63.2 percent to 47.4 percent in 2014. This may be 
explained by the fact that the Friedman’s Test found that there was no real statistical 
evidence of an increased level of reporting from 2014 to 2015. The lack of 
information on the appointment of a CAE could further explain the poor internal 
controls in place at state owned companies which do not work effectively as is widely 
reported in media reports. 
A significant increase was observed from 2014 to 2015 as to the number of state 
owned entities that reported at a level 5 disclosure in respect of having the IAF 
subject to an independent quality review. This is in line with the call for greater 
independent assurance from stakeholders (Atkins and Maroun, 2012) and the 
increased importance that the IAF has gained more recently in ensuring good 
corporate governance (Gramling et al., 2004). 
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Figure 4.10: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on the internal audit function based on the different levels of disclosure. 
 
4.4.8 The Governance of Information Technology  
In respect of the governance of IT, one of the most significant improvements was 
witnessed over the three years analysed for any indicator. The mean increased from 
a dismal 1.4649 in 2013 to 1.8070 in 2014 and finally to a significantly improved 
mean of 2.5 in 2015 (per Table 4.2). Furthermore, the statistical analysis of Figure 
4.11 shows that the number of state owned companies that did not comply with IT 
governance requirements halved on average from 42.1 percent in 2013 to 21.1 
percent in 2015. These findings are in line with the realization that the governance of 
IT can create a completive advantage for an entity if adopted and governed correctly 
or spell disaster if it is not (Nolan and McFarlan, 2005; Trautman and Altenbaumer-
Price, 2011). 
Disclosure relating to the governance of IT is still however lacking based on the 
results of this study. The appointment of a CIO to manage the IT function has 
improved from on average 94.7 percent non-compliance by companies in 2013 to 
63.3 percent in average in 2015. Although it is a major improvement the fact that the 
vast majority of state owned companies do not comply with this requirements still is a 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 0.0% 36.8% 42.1% 21.1% 0.0%
2014 0.0% 21.1% 36.8% 42.1% 0.0%
2015 0.0% 10.5% 47.4% 36.8% 5.3%
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matter of great concern, given the importance of IT in the current economic world. A 
further concern is that there was a decreasing trend experienced in the number of 
state owned companies that did not provide any disclosure on the board’s 
consideration of IT investment from 2014 to 2015. This is concerning as governance 
should be driven from the top down to ensure effective adoption of good governance 
throughout an entity in a matter of such importance as is the case with IT (IOD, 
2009).  
An improvement was seen in the consideration of overall risk as well as financial 
risks in relation to IT with between 3 and 4 companies disclosing such information on 
a level 5 rating. 
 
Figure 4.11: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on the governance of information technology based on the different levels of 
disclosure. 
 
4.4.9 Compliance with Laws, Rules, Codes and Standards 
Another area where disclosure improved fairly well was compliance with laws, codes 
and standards. Disclosure moved from providing little information to a satisfactorily 
disclosing some information with a mean of 3.6842 in 2015. This upward trend is 
further supported by the fact that there was not one state owned company that did 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 42.1% 57.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
2014 36.8% 42.1% 15.8% 5.3% 0.0%
2015 21.1% 36.8% 21.1% 5.3% 15.8%
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
s
ta
te
 o
w
n
e
d
 c
o
m
p
a
n
ie
s
 t
h
a
t 
re
p
o
rt
 o
n
 t
h
e
 g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
c
e
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
  
70 
 
not comply with this disclosure requirement in 2015 compared to one company in 
2014 and two companies in 2013 (Figure 4.12). This surge in disclosure may be 
attributable to the fact that stakeholders of entities require greater information of the 
factors and risks that can affect entity value (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2014) such as, 
non-compliance with laws and regulations. There were vast improvements in 
disclosure by state owned companies to the set-up of a compliance function and the 
oversight that they provide in terms of compliance with laws, regulations, codes and 
standards. Furthermore, the disclosure of non-binding codes and standards which 
state owned entities adhere to was significantly improved with a decrease in the 
average number of companies that did not disclose information on this indicator from 
31.6 percent in 2014 to 10.5% in 2015. An average increase from 15.8 percent in 
2014 to 31.6 percent of state owned companies that reported excellent disclosure in 
relation to disclosure of compliance with non-binding rules and standards was also 
observed. This is a step in the right direction for state owned companies in ensuring 
transparency in the interest of good corporate governance. 
 
Figure 4.12: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on the compliance with laws, codes, rules and standards based on the different 
levels of disclosure. 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 10.5% 42.1% 15.8% 26.3% 5.3%
2014 5.3% 15.8% 36.8% 31.6% 10.5%
2015 0.0% 15.8% 26.3% 42.1% 15.8%
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4.4.10 Governing Stakeholder Relationships 
Disclosure in relation to the governances of stakeholder relationships improved, 
following an upward trend from a mean score of 2.2632 in 2013 to 3.3947 in 2015.  
This resulted in the disclosure by state owned companies in respect of stakeholder 
relations, improving from poor to average. There was a vast decrease in the number 
of state owned companies that did not comply with the requirements of this 
subsection as depicted in Figure 4.13 from 21.1 percent non-compliance in 2013 to 
only 5.3 percent in 2015. Furthermore, 2015 seen disclosure for this subcategory 
reached an excellent level for 26.3 percent of companies compared to 0 percent in 
the prior periods analysed. Improvements were seen in the identification of 
stakeholders by state owned companies with only 1 company not identifying and 
disclosing who its stakeholders were in 2015 compared to 9 in 2013. These points to 
the fact that state owned companies are realising the importance that stakeholder 
relationships play in improving entity value (IIRC, 2013). Furthermore, pressure on 
state owned companies to meet stakeholders expectations in terms of accountability 
(KPMG, 2012), may be the reason for the increased interest in taking stakeholders 
interests into account. 
 
Figure 4.13: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on the governance of shareholder relationships based on the different levels of 
disclosure. 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 21.1% 36.8% 15.8% 26.3% 0.0%
2014 5.3% 26.3% 26.3% 26.3% 15.8%
2015 5.3% 10.5% 36.8% 21.1% 26.3%
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4.4.11 Integrated Reporting  
The application of the overall disclosure requirements per King III and the IR 
Framework by state owned companies improved by 21.62 percent  in  2014 from 
disclosure in 2013, which disclosed very little information. As indicated in Table 4.2 
the year 2015 seen disclosure just reached a satisfactory level. It was observed that 
not one of the state owned companies analysed, reported on a level 5 disclosure for 
this subcategory over all three years analysed, which suggest that there is still room 
for improvement for these disclosures that are made in the  integrated reports by 
state owned companies. A commendable improvement was that on average the 
number of state owned companies that reported on a level 4 disclosure level 
improved from 0 percent in 2013 to 15.8 percent in 2014 and finally increased to 
36.8 percent in 2015 (Figure 4.14). This improvement observed could also explain 
the reduction in the number of state owned companies that on average reported on a 
level 2, disclosure level as they move upward by disclosing information at a level 3 or 
4 basis (Figure 4.14). On inspection at a deeper level on the results of the state 
owned companies analysed, it was found that financial and sustainability issues such 
as social, economic and environmental impacts were assessed and taken in into 
account in one or more documents relating to the integrated reports by all state 
owned companies in 2015. This follows the upward trend in reducing non-
compliance with the requirements of this subcategory of indicators from 2013. The 
conciseness of reports also improved in line with the findings of Atkins and Maroun 
(2012), regarding the call for integrated reports to be more concise. Integrated 
reporting amongst state owned entities has also become more balanced, with the 
majority of entities reporting information in a more balanced way as time progressed. 
This may be as a result of state owned companies becoming more familiar with 
integrated reporting as time goes by and improving their disclosures due to their 
increased experience in preparing integrated reports.  
An issue that still persisted is the lack on connectivity of information in integrated 
reports issued by state owned companies. The majority of state owned companies 
are still battling with this concept and are only able to connect information at a level 2 
disclosure. It can be assumed that in accordance with the manner in which state 
owned companies improved the balance of their reporting, with time their integrated 
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reports will have greater connectivity of information as evidenced by the upward 
trend in connecting information in these reports from 2013 to 2015. 
 
Figure 4.14: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report integrated reporting based on the different levels of disclosure. 
 
4.4.12 Organizational Overview and External Environment 
Disclosure on the organizational overview and external environment of state owned 
companies improved from disclosure which was satisfactory in 2013 with a mean of 
3.0526 to 3.9123 in 2015, as indicated in Table 4.2. The score in 2015 achieved on 
average by state owned companies suggests that disclosure is at a good level and 
improving steadily in this regard. Ten state owned companies on average reported at 
a level 4 disclosure and 4s at a level 5 compared to 11 and 0 in 2013 and 2014 
respectively as depicted in Figure 4.15. The improvement seen can be attributable to 
the adoption of the IR Framework principles in respect of the preparation and 
presentation of integrated reports which was released in 2013 and as such its 
implementation improved as the years progressed. Generally, the state owned 
companies that were analysed improved their disclosure in terms of disclosing the 
external factors affecting the entity, identifying the vison and mission of the entity and 
recognizing the importance that the identification of the competitive landscape in 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 0.0% 52.6% 47.4% 0.0% 0.0%
2014 0.0% 31.6% 52.6% 15.8% 0.0%
2015 0.0% 21.1% 42.1% 36.8% 0.0%
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which the entity operates can have on value creation per the IR Framework. 
Improvement in this regard can be attributable to the adoption of the IR Framework. 
 
Figure 4.15: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on the organizational overview and external environment based on the different 
levels of disclosure 
4.4.13 Governance  
Disclosure in respect of how an entity’s governance structure supports value creation 
in the short, medium and long-term was one of the indicators that was drastically 
improved. The mean score achieved improved from a poor 1.7368 in 2013 to an 
impressive 2.7368 in 2015. Although the disclosure is still just below satisfactory, the 
improvement in disclosure for this indicator is improving well. The improvement can 
again be linked to the application of the IR Framework which as per the results of 
this study has improved integrated reporting disclosure. Figure 4.16 shows on 
average the percentage of state owned entities that reported at the different levels of 
disclosure in respect of this indicator, which clearly depicts the massive improvement 
in the disclosure. 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 5.3% 21.1% 31.6% 42.1% 0.0%
2014 0.0% 5.3% 26.3% 57.9% 10.5%
2015 5.3% 0.0% 21.1% 52.6% 21.1%
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Figure 4.16: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on governance based on the different levels of disclosure 
 
4.4.14 Business Model 
The importance of the business model of an entity and the fruitful information it 
provides for decision making (IIRC, 2013), has led state owned companies to 
improve the disclosure of their business models in their integrated reports. The mean 
score achieved by state owned entities in respect of the disclosure of their business 
models improved from by 0.3258 from 2013 to 2014 and 0.3895 from 2014 to 2015 
(Table 4.2).  
The results of this report have shown that satisfactory information is currently being 
provided by state owned companies in relation to their business model. A major 
improvement from 2013 was that on average not 1 company did not disclose 
information on their business model in both 2014 and 2015. Furthermore, 2015 seen 
the percentage of state owned companies that on average report on a level 2 
disclosure to decrease from 52.6 percent in 2013 to 26.8 percent in 2015 and the 
companies that report on a level 5 disclosure to increase from 0 percent in 2013 to 
10.5 percent in 2015, as indicated in Figure 4.17. The number of state owned 
companies that on average report on a level 4 in respect of describing the entity’s 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 47.4% 36.8% 10.5% 5.3% 0.0%
2014 21.1% 36.8% 26.3% 15.8% 0.0%
2015 15.8% 26.3% 31.6% 21.1% 5.3%
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business model, increased from 15.8 percent in 2014 to 36.8 percent which is a step 
in the right direction in applying the IR framework requirements for this disclosure.  
An area that should still be addressed is related to entities needing to disclose 
information on how key inputs into their business model relates to the capitals of the 
entity. Although decreasing year on year, the number of state owned companies that 
on average do not disclose information relating to how key inputs into their business 
model relates to the capitals of the entity is still high at 57.9 percent in 2015. This 
should be addressed effectively and efficiently in order to allow for stakeholders to 
understand the business model of the company more adequately. 
 
Figure 4.17: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on the business of the entity based on the different levels of disclosure 
4.4.15 Risks and Opportunities  
Disclosure as to the key risk and opportunities that the entity has identified, including 
those that have an impact of the capitals of an entity in the short, medium and long-
term has improved very well from 2013 to 2015. The mean score achieved increased 
from 2.3684 in 2013 to 3 in 2014 and 3.6842 in 2015 based on Table 4.2.   
As reflected in Figure 4.18, an impressive 47.4 percent of state owned companies on 
average reported at a level 5 disclosure in 2015. It can be deduced that this is a key 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 10.5% 52.6% 21.1% 15.8% 0.0%
2014 0.0% 57.9% 21.1% 15.8% 5.3%
2015 0.0% 36.8% 26.3% 26.3% 10.5%
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item that is being addressed by state owned companies given the realisation that the 
identification of risks and opportunities play in creating value for an entity. 
 
Figure 4.18: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on risk and opportunities based on the different levels of disclosure. 
 
4.4.16 Strategy and Resource Allocation 
State owned companies drastically improved their disclosure relating to strategy and 
resource allocation from disclosing little information in a poor manner to providing 
good disclosure on strategy and resource allocation. This is evidenced by the 
increase in the mean score achieved from 2.4737 in 2013 to 3.7368 in 2015. 
Furthermore, not one state owned company did not disclose information on this 
indicator and 63.1 percent of state owned companies reported on a level 3 and 4 
disclosure, as indicated in Figure 4.19. A reason for the increased focus on strategy 
by state owned companies may be due to the increased calls for state owned 
companies to have a clear robust plan to achieve their objectives. 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 36.8% 26.3% 5.3% 26.3% 5.3%
2014 15.8% 21.1% 26.3% 21.1% 15.8%
2015 15.8% 10.5% 10.5% 15.8% 47.4%
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Figure 4.19: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on strategy and resource allocation based on the different levels of disclosure. 
 
4.4.17 Performance 
Disclosure in relation to performance information by state owned companies was 
originally satisfactory in 2013 and thereafter increased to good with more detail 
provided in relation to performance. In respect of disclosing both quantitative and 
qualitative information on performance, on average the percentage of state owned 
companies who provided excellent disclosure in this regard in 2015 was 42.1 
percent,  up from 21.1 percent in 2014 and a mere 5.3 percent in 2013, which is 
supported by the data in Figure 4.20. This suggests that more state owned 
companies are increasingly realising the value of providing not only quantitative 
information on performance but qualitative as well. A significant improvement was 
also seen in the number of state owned companies that provide Key Performance 
Indicators (KPI’s) that combine financial measures with other measures as well. Non-
compliance in this regard decreased from 4 companies in 2013 to 1 in 2014 and 
finally 0 in 2015. Again, the implementation and time of adoption of the IR 
Framework seems to have played an important part in improving the level of 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 5.3% 47.4% 42.1% 5.3% 0.0%
2014 0.0% 15.8% 36.8% 42.1% 5.3%
2015 0.0% 15.8% 21.1% 36.8% 26.3%
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disclosure made in this regard, given the increased scrutiny surrounding state owned 
company performance. 
 
Figure 4.20: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on performance based on the different levels of disclosure. 
4.4.18 Outlook 
Disclosure in relation to the outlook of the entity is another area where a significant 
improvement was seen. The level of reporting improved from bordering on non-
compliant to just below satisfactory for this subcategory. The level of non-compliance 
has dropped significantly and as a result disclosure has improved with most state 
owned entities now providing disclosure on the outlook for entity in most cases at a 
lower level due to late adoption of this principle in 2014 but this gradually improved in 
2015 to include disclosures at levels as high as 5 for 5 companies (Figure 4.21). 
An area addressed but which still has a large percentage of state owned companies 
that on average are non-compliant is in respect of the provision of lead indicators 
and KPI’s. The level of non-compliance on this disclosure item is still high at 42.1 
percent on average in 2015 although, improved from the prior periods. A reason for 
the high levels of non-compliance with the provision of lead indicators and KPI’s 
could be due to the fact that state owned companies are still getting comfortable with 
reporting on the future outlook on an entity in general and as a result may be battling 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 0.0% 21.1% 42.1% 21.1% 15.8%
2014 0.0% 5.3% 36.8% 26.3% 31.6%
2015 0.0% 0.0% 21.1% 31.6% 47.4%
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in terms of actually providing lead indicators due to teething issues in the adoption of 
integrated reporting. 
 
Figure 4.21: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on outlook based on the different levels of disclosure. 
 
4.4.19 Basis of Preparation 
The mean level of disclosure for information pertaining to the basis upon which the 
integrated reports are prepared has pleasingly improved. State owned companies do 
provide little detail on the basis of preparation of their integrated reports however, 
per Figure 4.22, 57.9 percent of state owned companies on average do not provide 
any information on this disclosure. This is an area that should be improved in order 
for stakeholders to gain greater clarity per the IR Framework of how and why 
information was included in the integrated report so that they can make informed 
assessments on the entity (IIRC, 2013). The lack of compliance on the provision of 
information on the basis of preparation of an entity’s integrated report can again be 
attributable to the late adoption of the IR Framework by state owned companies. 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 15.8% 52.6% 15.8% 10.5% 5.3%
2014 10.5% 42.1% 36.8% 10.5% 0.0%
2015 15.8% 26.3% 26.3% 15.8% 15.8%
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Figure 4.22: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report on the basis of preparation based on the different levels of disclosure. 
 
4.5 Overall Observations  
Analysing the number of state owned companies that reported at the different 
disclosure levels overall as indicated in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.23, it can be seen 
that no company had an overall classification of 1 in any of the three years and no 
company had an overall classification of 5 in any of the three years. No company 
had a classification of 4 (good) in 2013 while 15.8 percent of the companies had an 
overall classification of 4 in 2014 and 47.4 percent of the companies were classified 
at level 4 in 2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 84.2% 10.5% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3%
2014 73.7% 15.8% 0.0% 10.5% 0.0%
2015 57.9% 15.8% 0.0% 15.8% 10.5%
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Table 4.4: The average level of disclosure made by state owned companies in their 
integrated reports 
Year  
Level of disclosure 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
2013 
Number of 
companies 
0 10 9 0 0 19 
Percentage 
of 
companies   
0 52.6% 47.4% 0.0% 0 100.0% 
2014 
Number of 
companies 
0 3 13 3 0 19 
Percentage 
of 
companies   
0 15.8% 68.4% 15.8% 0 100.0% 
2015 
Number of 
companies 
0 2 8 9 0 19 
Percentage 
of 
companies   
0 10.5% 42.1% 47.4% 0 100.0% 
 
 
Figure 4.23: Bar graph representing the percentage of state owned companies that 
report overall on the different levels of disclosure. 
 
1 2 3 4 5
2013 0.0% 52.6% 47.4% 0.0% 0.0%
2014 0.0% 15.8% 68.4% 15.8% 0.0%
2015 0.0% 10.5% 42.1% 47.4% 0.0%
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On an overall basis across all the indicators tested in this report, the mean score 
achieved by state owned companies in respect of the level of disclosure in their 
integrated reports as whole has followed an upward trend to provide more 
information. Over the three years analysed, the mean average for disclosure by state 
owned companies in their integrated report moved from providing little information at 
score of 2.5496 to providing just below satisfactory information in 2014 at a score of 
2.9962. Finally, the information disclosed by state owned entities in their integrated 
report as a whole improved to proving some information in a satisfactory manner at a 
score of 3.3454 in 2015.  
4.6 Conclusion  
It is evident from the overall analysis that as time progresses the level of integrated 
reporting by state owned companies improve with experience and adoption of 
standards such as the IR Framework in respect of integrated reporting.  These 
further highlights the improving trend in disclosure made by state owned companies 
in their integrated reports. Although improving, the level of disclosure is still only 
satisfactory and as such there is a lot of room for improvement over time.  Areas has 
highlighted above that should be addressed effectively relate to governance, the 
governance of information technology, the provision of information on the outlook of 
the entity and information as to the basis upon which integrated reports are 
prepared. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The purpose of this report was to analyse the trends in integrated reporting from a 
state owned company perspective.  The analysis of the trending in integrated 
reporting by state owned companies was conducted by means of analysing the 
annual/integrated reports of all the state owned companies that formed part of 
Schedule 2 of the PFMA for the disclosure per King III and the IR Framework. This 
analysis was carried out for the 2013, 2014 and 2015 financial years of each state 
owned company and where the 2015 results were not available the analysis was 
done over the 2012, 2013 and 2014 financial years. The disclosures made in the 
integrated reports of the various state owned entities analysed, was scored against a 
scorecard which classified disclosure as non-compliant, poor/average, good or 
excellent. The mean scores of the disclosures made by all the state owned 
companies was then determined based on each subcategory of indicators analysed 
and for the indicators as a whole. The mean scores was then further analysed to 
provide information as to the percentage of state owned companies that reported 
under the different levels of disclosure. The Friedman’s test and Spearman’s rho was 
also used to determine if the level of disclosure increased or not and if there was a 
pattern in reporting disclosure respectively. 
The results of analysis of the trends in integrated reporting by state owned 
companies revealed that there was a strong pattern in reporting disclosures from the 
2013 financial year to the 2014 financial year and the 2014 financial year to the 2015 
financial year. The level of reporting was found to have increased between 2013 and 
2014, 2014 and 2015 and 2013 and 2015 however the increase in disclosure from 
2014 to 2015 could not be proved to be statistically significant. The mean scores 
observed for the disclosures made by state owned companies followed an increasing 
positive trend with the disclosures on average increasing from providing little 
information on a poor to average basis in 2013 to providing some information at a 
satisfactory level in 2015. It was also found that no state owned company had on 
average an overall classification of 1 (non-compliance) in any of the three years and 
no company had an overall classification of 5 (excellent disclosure) in any of the 
three years analysed. This suggests that although improving, the level of disclosure 
by state owned companies is still only satisfactory and as such there is a lot of room 
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for improvement over time. Areas as highlighted in chapter 4 that are in need of 
reform relate to governance, the governance of information technology, the provision 
of information on the outlook of the entity and information as to the basis upon which 
integrated reports are prepared. Areas where information was disclosed well by state 
owned companies include issues relating to the risk committee per King III, 
performance information and information pertaining to the organizational overview of 
the entity and external environment it operates in. Furthermore, it was observed that 
the adoption of the principles of the IR Framework by state owned entities tended to 
improve their reporting disclosure and as state owned companies become more 
comfortable with integrated reporting and the frameworks that can be applied to 
enable effective and efficient disclosure of information, the level of disclosure by 
state owned companies in their integrated reports will improve over time. 
An area for future research includes analysing if the adoption of integrated reporting 
by state owned entities has a positive effect on the economic value of the entity 
given, the increased adoption of integrated reporting by state owned entities. 
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Annexure A: Research Indicators used 
 
 
Research Indicators 
  Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship [King III – Chapter 1] 
1 
Effective leadership based on ethical values such as integrity, honesty, 
independence, 
accountability and trust can be ascertained from the integrated report. [Par. 1] 
2 Company strategies and vision are clearly outlined. [Par. 7, 9, 35] 
3 Mission statement and company values are provided. [Par. 9, 10] 
4 Ethical standards are articulated in the code of conduct. [Par. 12-15] 
5 
Independent assurance of ethics by internal audit or external assurance 
providers.[Par. 52] 
  Boards and directors [King III – Chapter 2] 
6 Company is governed by a unitary board of directors. [Par. 62] 
7 Directors are appointed through a formal process. [Principle 2.19, Par. 80-82] 
8 Board is comprised of the majority of non-executive directors. [Par. 64] 
9 Of the non-executive directors, the majority are independent. [Par. 64] 
10 Board is chaired by a non-executive independent director. [Par. 38] 
11 
Board has appointed a lead independent director, if the chairman is not 
independent. [Par. 38] 
12 The CEO is a board member. [Par. 47, 73] 
13 The financial director (or CFO) is a board member. [Par. 47, 73] 
14 Qualifications and experience of directors are disclosed. [Par. 88] 
15 
Board is assisted by a competent, suitably qualified and experienced company 
secretary. [Principle 2.21] 
16 
Board is regulated by a formal charter which sets out the role of the board and 
each director. [Par. 1] 
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17 
Appointment of well-structured committees to deal with key functions of the 
board, whichinclude separate audit, risk, remuneration and nomination 
committees as a minimum.[Principle 2.23, par. 130] 
18 
Committees are regulated by formal charters which set out the role of 
individual 
committees. [Par. 125-126] 
19 Board meets at least 4 times a year. [Par. 1] 
20 Induction programme for new directors is in place. [Par. 89-90] 
21 Ongoing training for all directors is in place. [Par. 92] 
22 
Performance of the board, individual directors and committees is evaluated on 
a regular 
23 Basis. [Par. 109-114] 
24 Share option scheme is not available to non-executive directors. [Par. 154] 
25 
 Policy is in place for appointment and retirement of directors. [Par. 74-75, 80-
82] 
26  Remuneration of directors and senior executives is disclosed. [Par. 180] 
27 
Remuneration of the three most highly-paid employees (other than directors) is 
disclosed. [Par. 180] 
28 
Remuneration policy regarding directors is approved by the shareholders. 
[Par. 186] 
  C. Audit Committees (King III-Chapter 3) 
29 
Audit committee is appointed by the board (through the nomination committee) 
and is approved by the shareholders. [Par. 3] 
30 
Formal charter and processes are in place outlining the functions of the audit 
committee. 
[Par. 6 of Audit Committees, Par. 125,126,129&134 of Boards & Directors] 
31 
 Suitably skilled and experienced independent non-executive directors. 
[Principle 3.2,Par. 12-15] 
32 Comprised of at least three non-executive, independent directors. [Par. 10] 
33 Chairman of the Board is not a member of the audit committee. [Par. 11] 
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34 
Chaired by a non-executive, independent director, other than the chairman of 
the Board. [Principle 3.3] 
35 Meets at least 2 times a year. [Par. 7] 
36 Satisfactory attendance of audit committee as per attendance register. [Par. 7] 
37 Oversees internal and financial controls. [Par. 30, 64, 66-70] 
38 
Oversees internal audit function. [Par. 66-70, Principle 7.4 of Internal Audit 
Function] 
39 
Oversees financial risk management (and other risks if necessary). [Par. 64, 
65] 
40 
Assesses the performance, expertise and skills of the financial function 
including 
financial director. [Par. 51, 52] 
41 
Oversees the preparation of the integrated report (including sustainability 
issues). 
[Principle 3.4, Par. 24-29] 
42 
Audit committee (or company as a whole) applies a combined assurance 
model inproviding assurance on activities such as risk, compliance, internal 
audit andgovernance. [Principle 3.5, Par. 46-48] 
43 Evaluates independence and credentials of the external auditor. [Par. 77] 
44 Evaluates performance of the external auditor. [Par. 77] 
45 
Reports to the board and shareholders how it carried out its responsibilities. 
[Principle 
3.10, Par. 83-85] 
  
D. Risk management committee [King III – Chapter 4; Researcher’s own 
indicator] 
46 
Board appoints risk and/or audit committee to oversee risk management. [Par. 
16] 
47 
Risk (or audit) committee consists of at least 3 directors (both executive and 
non-executive). [Par. 20, 21] 
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48 
It is chaired by an independent non-executive director, other than chairman of 
the board or the executive director (not required by King III but considered 
necessary for the purposes of this research). [Researcher’s own indicator] 
49 
Formal charter and processes are in place outlining the functions of the 
risk/audit committee. [Par. 5] 
50 Risk (or audit) committee meets at least 2 times a year. [Par. 22] 
51 
Risk committee (or audit/board) identifies key financial risks and quantify them, 
if possible. [Par. 31-34, 40, 41-43] 
52 
Risk committee (or audit/board) identifies key non-financial risks and quantify 
them, if possible. [Par. 31-34, 41-43] 
53 
Risk committee (or audit/board) explains how the identified financial risks will 
be 
addressed. [Par. 31-34, 40, 41-43] 
54 
Risk committee (or audit/board) explains how the identified non-financial risks 
will be addressed. [Par. 31-34, 41-43] 
55 
Risk committee (or audit/board) sets levels of risk tolerance. [Principle 4.2, 
Par. 11-15] 
56 
Risk committee (or audit/board) expresses its views on the effectiveness of the 
company's risk management processes. [Par. 4] 
  E. Remuneration committee [King III – Chapter 2] 
57 
Remuneration committee comprises at least 2 non-executive and independent 
directors. [Researcher’s own indicator] 
58 
It is chaired by an independent non-executive director, other than the chairman 
of theBoard or executive director. [Par. 131 of Boards & Directors] 
59 
Formal charter and processes are in place outlining the functions of the 
remuneration committee. [Par. 125,126&134 of Boards & Directors] 
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60 
Remuneration committee meets at least 2 times a year (not required by King 
III but considered necessary for the purposes of this research). [Researcher’s 
own indicator]  
61 
Remuneration committee or other structure determines remuneration of 
executive and Non-executive directors. [Par. 150 of Boards & Directors] 
  F. Nomination committee [King III – Chapter 2] 
62 
It is chaired by an independent non-executive director, who can also be the 
chairman of 
the Board, other than the executive director. [Par. 131 of Boards & Directors] 
63 
Directors nominated by the committee or other structure are presented for 
approval by 
the shareholders. [Par. 80 of Boards & Directors] 
  G. Internal audit function [King III – Chapter 7] 
64 
Internal audit function has been set up (within the company or externally). 
[Par. 1] 
65 Internal audit function reports to the audit committee. [Par. 24, 33] 
66 
Internal audit is headed by the chief audit executive (CAE) or external 
company. [Par. 
11] 
67 
Internal audit (or its CAE) / external company attends audit committee 
meetings, board 
meetings by invitation. [Par. 28, 29, 34] 
68 
Internal audit/other structure provides assurance on the effectiveness of 
internal control 
environment. [Principle 7.3, Par. 2, 12-17] 
69 
Internal audit/other structure provides assurance on the effectiveness of risk 
management. [Principle 7.3, Par. 2, 12-17] 
70 
Internal audit/other structure provides assurance on the effectiveness of 
governance 
(including ethics). [Par. 2] 
71 Internal audit is subjected to an independent quality review. [Par. 23] 
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72 
Internal audit follows a risk-based approach to its plan. [Principle 7.2, Par. 7, 
18] 
  H. Governance of information technology [King III – Chapter 5] 
73 
Board or other structure monitors and evaluates significant IT investments and 
expenditure. [Principle 5.4] 
74 
A suitably qualified and experienced chief information officer (CIO) is 
appointed tomanage IT. [Par. 20] 
75 
Board or other structure ensures that IT complies with IT related laws, rules, 
codes and 
standards. [Par. 33] 
76 
Risk committee or other structure oversees overall risk implications of IT. [Par. 
30-34; 
43-47] 
77 
Audit committee or other structure oversees financial risk implications of IT. 
[Par. 47] 
78 
Board receives an independent assurance on the effectiveness of IT through 
internal 
audit function and/or external assurance providers. [Par. 28] 
  I. Compliance laws, rules, codes and standards [King III – Chapter 6] 
79 Compliance function has been set up by the company. [Par. 16] 
80 
Compliance function/other structure oversees compliance with laws, rules, 
codes and 
standards. [Principle 6.1] 
81 
Company discloses non-binding rules, codes and standards to which it 
adheres. [Par. 6] 
  J. Governing stakeholder relationships [King III – Chapter 8 
82 
Board identifies key stakeholders and their interests on a regular basis. [Par. 
7, 8 of 
King III] 
83 
Interests of key stakeholders are taken into account in the integrated report. 
[Par. 7, 9 
of King III]  
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  K. Integrated reporting King III – Chapter 9, IRC framework indicators  
84 
Financial and sustainability issues on economic, social and environmental all 
covered in 
one or more documents of integrated report. [Par. 1] 
85 
Information in the integrated report is connected showing interdependencies 
between factors that create value over time (IR 3.6) 
86 
The integrated report provides insight into the nature and quality of the 
organizations relationships with its key stakeholders including to what extent 
the organization takes theirs needs into account (IR 3.10) 
87 The integrated report is concise (IR3.36) 
88 
The integrated report provides both positive and negative information in a 
balanced way (IR 3.39) 
89 
The integrated report is comparable between organizations and consistent 
over time (IR 3.54) 
  IRC framework indicators  
  Organizational overview and external environment (IR 4A) 
90 
Integrated report identifies organizations mission and vision and identifies 
essential context of the entity (IR 4.5) 
91 
Identifies the entities culture, ownership structure and competitive landscape 
(IR 4.5)  
92 
The integrated report  identifies significant factors affecting the external 
environment include aspects of the legal, commercial, social, environmental 
and political context that affect the organization’s ability to create value in the 
short, medium or long term. (IR 4.6) 
  Governance 4B 
93 
The Integrated reports sets out how the organization’s governance structure 
support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term (IR 4.8) 
  Business Model 4C 
94 The integrated report describes the entiy's business model (IR 4.12) 
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95 
The integrated report shows how key inputs relate to the capitals on which the 
organization depends on and is material to understanding the business model 
(IR  4.1.4) 
96 The integrated report describes key business activities (IR4.16) 
97 
The integrated report identifies an organizations key products and services 
(IR4.18) 
98 The integrated report identifies key outcomes of the business model (IR 4.19) 
  Risks and opportunities 4D 
99 
An integrated report identifies the key risks and opportunities that are specific 
to the organization, including those that relate to the organization’s effects on, 
and the continued availability, quality and affordability of, relevant capitals in 
the short, medium and long term. (IR4.24) 
  Strategy and resource allocation 4E 
100 
The integrated report identifies where the organisation wants to go and how it 
tends to get there including a description of the linkage between the 
organization’s strategy and resource allocation (IR4.27-4.29) 
  Performance 4F 
101 
The integrated report contains qualitative and quantitative information about 
performance pertaining to whether the entity has achieved its strategic 
objectives and the outcomes effect on capitals (IR4.31) 
102 
KPI’s combine financial measures with other measures (IR4.32) 
  Outlook 4G 
103 
The integrated report identifies what challenges and uncertainties is the 
organization likely to encounter in pursuing its strategy, and what are the 
potential implications for its business model and future performance (IR4.34) 
104 The integrated report provides lead indicators, KPI’s or objectives (IR 4.38) 
  Basis of preparation 4H 
105 
The How does the organization determine what matters to include in the 
integrated report and how are such matters quantified or evaluated (IR4.40) 
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Annexure B: The percentage of state owned companies that report on each 
individual indicator and the level of disclosure the companies scored on 
average 
 
 Research Indicator Score 
per 
year 1 Non-
complian
ce 
2 Little 
detail 
provided 
(poor/ave
rage) 
3 Some 
detail 
provided 
(satisfactory) 
4 More 
detail 
provided 
(good) 
5 Much 
detail 
provided 
(very 
good) Total 
1 Effective leadership based on 
ethical values such as 
integrity, honesty, 
independence, 
Accountability and trust can 
be ascertained from the 
integrated report. [Par. 1] 
2013 5 8 5 1 0 19 
26.3% 42.1% 26.3% 5.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 1 8 7 3 0 19 
5.3% 42.1% 36.8% 15.8% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 2 4 5 5 3 19 
10.5% 21.1% 26.3% 26.3% 15.8% 100.0% 
2 Company strategies and 
vision are clearly outlined. 
[Par. 7, 9, 35] 
2013 3 0 0 4 12 19 
15.8% 0.0% 0.0% 21.1% 63.2% 100.0% 
2014 0 0 0 4 15 19 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 21.1% 78.9% 100.0% 
2015 0 1 0 1 17 19 
0.0% 5.3% 0.0% 5.3% 89.5% 100.0% 
3 Mission statement and 
company values are provided. 
[Par. 9, 10] 
2013 4 0 1 3 11 19 
21.1% 0.0% 5.3% 15.8% 57.9% 100.0% 
2014 1 0 0 3 15 19 
5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 15.8% 78.9% 100.0% 
2015 1 0 0 2 16 19 
5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 84.2% 100.0% 
4 Ethical standards are 
articulated in the code of 
conduct. [Par. 12-15] 
2013 4 5 5 2 3 19 
21.1% 26.3% 26.3% 10.5% 15.8% 100.0% 
2014 0 7 7 3 2 19 
0.0% 36.8% 36.8% 15.8% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 1 5 3 4 6 19 
5.3% 26.3% 15.8% 21.1% 31.6% 100.0% 
5 Independent assurance of 
ethics by internal audit or 
external assurance providers. 
[Par. 52] 
2013 16 0 1 1 1 19 
84.2% 0.0% 5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 13 2 2 1 1 19 
68.4% 10.5% 10.5% 5.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 11 2 3 2 1 19 
57.9% 10.5% 15.8% 10.5% 5.3% 100.0% 
6 Company is governed by a 
unitary board of directors. 
[Par. 62] 
2013 3 1 1 0 14 19 
15.8% 5.3% 5.3% 0.0% 73.7% 100.0% 
2014 2 0 2 2 13 19 
10.5% 0.0% 10.5% 10.5% 68.4% 100.0% 
2015 1 1 2 0 15 19 
5.3% 5.3% 10.5% 0.0% 78.9% 100.0% 
7 Directors are appointed 
through a formal process. 
[Principle 2.19, Par. 80-82] 
2013 5 5 2 2 5 19 
26.3% 26.3% 10.5% 10.5% 26.3% 100.0% 
2014 6 3 1 4 5 19 
31.6% 15.8% 5.3% 21.1% 26.3% 100.0% 
2015 5 4 1 0 9 19 
26.3% 21.1% 5.3% 0.0% 47.4% 100.0% 
8 Board is comprised of the 2013 0 0 1 2 16 19 
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majority of non-executive 
directors. [Par. 64] 
0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 10.5% 84.2% 100.0% 
2014 0 0 0 3 16 19 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 15.8% 84.2% 100.0% 
2015 0 0 0 1 18 19 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 94.7% 100.0% 
9 Of the non-executive 
directors, the majority are 
independent. [Par. 64] 
2013 6 1 2 5 5 19 
31.6% 5.3% 10.5% 26.3% 26.3% 100.0% 
2014 7 0 1 5 6 19 
36.8% 0.0% 5.3% 26.3% 31.6% 100.0% 
2015 5 1 0 3 10 19 
26.3% 5.3% 0.0% 15.8% 52.6% 100.0% 
10 Board is chaired by a non-
executive independent 
director. [Par. 38] 
2013 0 3 2 3 11 19 
0.0% 15.8% 10.5% 15.8% 57.9% 100.0% 
2014 1 3 0 5 10 19 
5.3% 15.8% 0.0% 26.3% 52.6% 100.0% 
2015 1 1 1 2 14 19 
5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 10.5% 73.7% 100.0% 
11 Board has appointed a lead 
independent director, if the 
chairman is not independent. 
[Par. 38] 
2013 5 0 0 0 1 6 
83.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 100.0% 
2014 5 0 0 0 0 5 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 4 0 0 0 0 4 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
12 The CEO is a board member. 
[Par. 47, 73] 
2013 1 0 0 0 18 19 
5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 94.7% 100.0% 
2014 1 0 0 1 17 19 
5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 89.5% 100.0% 
2015 1 0 0 1 17 19 
5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 89.5% 100.0% 
13 The financial director (or 
CFO) is a board member. 
[Par. 47, 73] 
2013 6 0 0 0 13 19 
31.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 68.4% 100.0% 
2014 5 0 0 1 13 19 
26.3% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 68.4% 100.0% 
2015 4 0 0 1 14 19 
21.1% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 73.7% 100.0% 
14 Qualifications and experience 
of directors are disclosed. 
[Par. 88] 
2013 2 2 1 4 10 19 
10.5% 10.5% 5.3% 21.1% 52.6% 100.0% 
2014 3 2 1 1 12 19 
15.8% 10.5% 5.3% 5.3% 63.2% 100.0% 
2015 2 0 2 2 13 19 
10.5% 0.0% 10.5% 10.5% 68.4% 100.0% 
15 Board is assisted by a 
competent, suitably qualified 
and experienced company 
secretary. [Principle 2.21] 
2013 5 6 2 1 5 19 
26.3% 31.6% 10.5% 5.3% 26.3% 100.0% 
2014 1 7 2 2 7 19 
5.3% 36.8% 10.5% 10.5% 36.8% 100.0% 
2015 1 7 1 1 9 19 
5.3% 36.8% 5.3% 5.3% 47.4% 100.0% 
16 Board is regulated by a formal 
charter which sets out the role 
of the board and each 
director. [Par. 1] 
2013 0 8 5 5 1 19 
0.0% 42.1% 26.3% 26.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 0 4 10 3 2 19 
0.0% 21.1% 52.6% 15.8% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 0 4 6 4 5 19 
0.0% 21.1% 31.6% 21.1% 26.3% 100.0% 
17 Appointment of well-
structured committees to deal 
with key functions of the 
board, which 
include separate audit, risk, 
2013 0 0 10 4 5 19 
0.0% 0.0% 52.6% 21.1% 26.3% 100.0% 
2014 0 0 7 6 6 19 
0.0% 0.0% 36.8% 31.6% 31.6% 100.0% 
2015 0 0 9 5 5 19 
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remuneration and nomination 
committees as a minimum. 
[Principle 2.23, par. 130] 
0.0% 0.0% 47.4% 26.3% 26.3% 100.0% 
18 Committees are regulated by 
formal charters which set out 
the role of individual 
committees. [Par. 125-126] 
2013 3 10 3 1 2 19 
15.8% 52.6% 15.8% 5.3% 10.5% 100.0% 
2014 1 7 7 2 2 19 
5.3% 36.8% 36.8% 10.5% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 0 7 4 6 2 19 
0.0% 36.8% 21.1% 31.6% 10.5% 100.0% 
19 Board meets at least 4 times 
a year. [Par. 1] 
2013 0 0 0 2 17 19 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 89.5% 100.0% 
2014 0 0 0 2 17 19 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 89.5% 100.0% 
2015 1 0 0 0 18 19 
5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 94.7% 100.0% 
20 Induction programme for new 
directors is in place. [Par. 89-
90] 
2013 10 1 1 2 5 19 
52.6% 5.3% 5.3% 10.5% 26.3% 100.0% 
2014 6 1 3 2 7 19 
31.6% 5.3% 15.8% 10.5% 36.8% 100.0% 
2015 4 2 1 0 12 19 
21.1% 10.5% 5.3% 0.0% 63.2% 100.0% 
21 Ongoing training for all 
directors is in place. [Par. 92] 
2013 9 2 1 3 4 19 
47.4% 10.5% 5.3% 15.8% 21.1% 100.0% 
2014 8 1 3 2 5 19 
42.1% 5.3% 15.8% 10.5% 26.3% 100.0% 
2015 7 2 2 0 8 19 
36.8% 10.5% 10.5% 0.0% 42.1% 100.0% 
22 Performance of the board, 
individual directors and 
committees is evaluated on a 
regular basis. [Par. 109-114] 
2013 9 2 4 4 0 19 
47.4% 10.5% 21.1% 21.1% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 3 2 6 6 2 19 
15.8% 10.5% 31.6% 31.6% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 3 2 4 4 6 19 
15.8% 10.5% 21.1% 21.1% 31.6% 100.0% 
24 Share option scheme is not 
available to non-executive 
directors. [Par. 154] 
2013 16 1 0 0 2 19 
84.2% 5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 100.0% 
2014 13 2 1 1 2 19 
68.4% 10.5% 5.3% 5.3% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 13 2 1 0 3 19 
68.4% 10.5% 5.3% 0.0% 15.8% 100.0% 
25 Policy is in place for 
appointment and retirement of 
directors. [Par. 74-75, 80-82] 
2013 5 6 5 3 0 19 
26.3% 31.6% 26.3% 15.8% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 4 7 5 2 1 19 
21.1% 36.8% 26.3% 10.5% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 2 9 4 3 1 19 
10.5% 47.4% 21.1% 15.8% 5.3% 100.0% 
26 Remuneration of directors 
and senior executives is 
disclosed. [Par. 180] 
2013 2 3 8 2 4 19 
10.5% 15.8% 42.1% 10.5% 21.1% 100.0% 
2014 0 4 5 3 7 19 
0.0% 21.1% 26.3% 15.8% 36.8% 100.0% 
2015 0 3 5 4 7 19 
0.0% 15.8% 26.3% 21.1% 36.8% 100.0% 
27 Remuneration of the three 
most highly-paid employees 
(other than directors) is 
disclosed. [Par. 180] 
2013 6 2 8 1 2 19 
31.6% 10.5% 42.1% 5.3% 10.5% 100.0% 
2014 5 1 6 2 5 19 
26.3% 5.3% 31.6% 10.5% 26.3% 100.0% 
2015 5 2 6 1 5 19 
26.3% 10.5% 31.6% 5.3% 26.3% 100.0% 
28 Remuneration policy 2013 6 4 2 4 3 19 
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regarding directors is 
approved by the 
shareholders. [Par. 186] 
31.6% 21.1% 10.5% 21.1% 15.8% 100.0% 
2014 4 3 6 3 3 19 
21.1% 15.8% 31.6% 15.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
2015 4 0 5 6 4 19 
21.1% 0.0% 26.3% 31.6% 21.1% 100.0% 
29 Audit committee is appointed 
by the board (through the 
nomination committee) and is 
approved by the 
shareholders. [Par. 
2013 0 2 1 1 15 19 
0.0% 10.5% 5.3% 5.3% 78.9% 100.0% 
2014 0 1 2 0 16 19 
0.0% 5.3% 10.5% 0.0% 84.2% 100.0% 
2015 0 0 0 3 16 19 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 15.8% 84.2% 100.0% 
30 Formal charter and processes 
are in place outlining the 
functions of the audit 
committee. [Par. 6 of Audit 
Committees, P 
2013 1 8 4 3 3 19 
5.3% 42.1% 21.1% 15.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
2014 2 4 8 3 2 19 
10.5% 21.1% 42.1% 15.8% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 1 2 6 6 4 19 
5.3% 10.5% 31.6% 31.6% 21.1% 100.0% 
31 Suitably skilled and 
experienced independent 
non-executive directors. 
[Principle 3.2,Par. 12-15] 
2013 0 3 3 2 11 19 
0.0% 15.8% 15.8% 10.5% 57.9% 100.0% 
2014 0 3 3 1 12 19 
0.0% 15.8% 15.8% 5.3% 63.2% 100.0% 
2015 0 2 1 1 15 19 
0.0% 10.5% 5.3% 5.3% 78.9% 100.0% 
32 Comprised of at least three 
non-executive, independent 
directors. [Par. 10] 
2013 0 3 4 3 9 19 
0.0% 15.8% 21.1% 15.8% 47.4% 100.0% 
2014 1 3 2 3 10 19 
5.3% 15.8% 10.5% 15.8% 52.6% 100.0% 
2015 0 3 0 3 13 19 
0.0% 15.8% 0.0% 15.8% 68.4% 100.0% 
33 Chairman of the Board is not 
a member of the audit 
committee. [Par. 11] 
2013 0 0 0 1 18 19 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 94.7% 100.0% 
2014 1 0 1 2 15 19 
5.3% 0.0% 5.3% 10.5% 78.9% 100.0% 
2015 0 0 0 1 18 19 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 94.7% 100.0% 
34 Chaired by a non-executive, 
independent director, other 
than the chairman of the 
Board. [Principle 3.3] 
2013 0 0 5 4 10 19 
0.0% 0.0% 26.3% 21.1% 52.6% 100.0% 
2014 0 1 2 5 11 19 
0.0% 5.3% 10.5% 26.3% 57.9% 100.0% 
2015 0 1 0 4 14 19 
0.0% 5.3% 0.0% 21.1% 73.7% 100.0% 
35 Meets at least 2 times a year. 
[Par. 7] 
2013 0 0 1 0 18 19 
0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 0.0% 94.7% 100.0% 
2014 0 0 0 0 19 19 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2015 1 0 0 0 18 19 
5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 94.7% 100.0% 
36 Satisfactory attendance of 
audit committee as per 
attendance register. [Par. 7] 
2013 2 1 0 1 15 19 
10.5% 5.3% 0.0% 5.3% 78.9% 100.0% 
2014 0 0 1 2 16 19 
0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 10.5% 84.2% 100.0% 
2015 1 0 0 1 17 19 
5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 89.5% 100.0% 
37 Oversees internal and 
financial controls. [Par. 30, 
64, 66-70] 
2013 2 7 8 2 0 19 
10.5% 36.8% 42.1% 10.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 0 6 7 5 1 19 
0.0% 31.6% 36.8% 26.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 0 3 7 5 4 19 
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0.0% 15.8% 36.8% 26.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
38 Oversees internal audit 
function. [Par. 66-70, Principle 
7.4 of Internal Audit Function] 
2013 1 8 6 2 2 19 
5.3% 42.1% 31.6% 10.5% 10.5% 100.0% 
2014 0 6 6 5 2 19 
0.0% 31.6% 31.6% 26.3% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 0 3 8 3 5 19 
0.0% 15.8% 42.1% 15.8% 26.3% 100.0% 
39 Oversees financial risk 
management (and other risks 
if necessary). [Par. 64, 65] 
2013 2 8 5 2 2 19 
10.5% 42.1% 26.3% 10.5% 10.5% 100.0% 
2014 0 9 4 4 2 19 
0.0% 47.4% 21.1% 21.1% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 0 6 5 3 5 19 
0.0% 31.6% 26.3% 15.8% 26.3% 100.0% 
40 Assesses the performance, 
expertise and skills of the 
financial function including 
financial director. [Par. 51, 52] 
2013 7 3 5 3 1 19 
36.8% 15.8% 26.3% 15.8% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 5 5 7 2 0 19 
26.3% 26.3% 36.8% 10.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 3 7 3 4 2 19 
15.8% 36.8% 15.8% 21.1% 10.5% 100.0% 
41 Oversees the preparation of 
the integrated report 
(including sustainability 
issues). [Principle 3.4, Par. 
24-29] 
2013 8 4 6 1 0 19 
42.1% 21.1% 31.6% 5.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 7 5 6 0 1 19 
36.8% 26.3% 31.6% 0.0% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 4 6 3 3 3 19 
21.1% 31.6% 15.8% 15.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
42 Audit committee (or company 
as a whole) applies a 
combined assurance model in 
providing assurance on 
activities such as 
2013 2 7 5 4 1 19 
10.5% 36.8% 26.3% 21.1% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 1 5 7 3 3 19 
5.3% 26.3% 36.8% 15.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
2015 0 7 6 4 2 19 
0.0% 36.8% 31.6% 21.1% 10.5% 100.0% 
43 Evaluates independence and 
credentials of the external 
auditor. [Par. 77] 
2013 2 8 1 7 1 19 
10.5% 42.1% 5.3% 36.8% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 1 5 8 2 3 19 
5.3% 26.3% 42.1% 10.5% 15.8% 100.0% 
2015 1 3 6 3 6 19 
5.3% 15.8% 31.6% 15.8% 31.6% 100.0% 
44 valuates performance of the 
external auditor. [Par. 77] 
2013 3 8 2 6 0 19 
15.8% 42.1% 10.5% 31.6% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 1 7 6 2 3 19 
5.3% 36.8% 31.6% 10.5% 15.8% 100.0% 
2015 1 3 7 3 5 19 
5.3% 15.8% 36.8% 15.8% 26.3% 100.0% 
45 Reports to the board and 
shareholders how it carried 
out its responsibilities. 
[Principle 3.10, Par. 83-85] 
2013 2 1 14 2 0 19 
10.5% 5.3% 73.7% 10.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 1 1 12 5 0 19 
5.3% 5.3% 63.2% 26.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 0 1 9 5 4 19 
0.0% 5.3% 47.4% 26.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
46 Board appoints risk and/or 
audit committee to oversee 
risk management. [Par. 16] 
2013 0 0 1 0 18 19 
0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 0.0% 94.7% 100.0% 
2014 0 0 1 0 18 19 
0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 0.0% 94.7% 100.0% 
2015 0 0 1 0 18 19 
0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 0.0% 94.7% 100.0% 
47 Risk (or audit) committee 
consists of at least 3 directors 
(both executive and non 
2013 0 0 2 2 15 19 
0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 10.5% 78.9% 100.0% 
2014 0 1 2 2 14 19 
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executive). [Par. 20, 21] 0.0% 5.3% 10.5% 10.5% 73.7% 100.0% 
2015 0 0 2 3 14 19 
0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 15.8% 73.7% 100.0% 
48 It is chaired by an 
independent non-executive 
director, other than chairman 
of the board or the executive 
director (not 
2013 0 0 3 4 12 19 
0.0% 0.0% 15.8% 21.1% 63.2% 100.0% 
2014 0 0 2 6 11 19 
0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 31.6% 57.9% 100.0% 
2015 0 1 1 5 12 19 
0.0% 5.3% 5.3% 26.3% 63.2% 100.0% 
49 Formal charter and processes 
are in place outlining the 
functions of the risk/audit 
committee. [Par. 5] 
2013 2 10 5 1 1 19 
10.5% 52.6% 26.3% 5.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 0 6 8 3 2 19 
0.0% 31.6% 42.1% 15.8% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 0 4 7 5 3 19 
0.0% 21.1% 36.8% 26.3% 15.8% 100.0% 
50 Risk (or audit) committee 
meets at least 2 times a year. 
[Par. 22] 
2013 0 1 0 0 18 19 
0.0% 5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 94.7% 100.0% 
2014 0 0 0 1 18 19 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 94.7% 100.0% 
2015 1 0 0 1 17 19 
5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 89.5% 100.0% 
51  Risk committee (or 
audit/board) identifies key 
financial risks and quantify 
them, if possible. [Par. 31-34, 
40, 41-43] 
2013 4 7 3 5 0 19 
21.1% 36.8% 15.8% 26.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 1 5 5 7 1 19 
5.3% 26.3% 26.3% 36.8% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 2 3 1 8 5 19 
10.5% 15.8% 5.3% 42.1% 26.3% 100.0% 
52 Risk committee (or 
audit/board) identifies key 
non-financial risks and 
quantify them, if possible. 
[Par. 31-34, 41-43] 
2013 5 7 4 3 0 19 
26.3% 36.8% 21.1% 15.8% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 2 4 6 6 1 19 
10.5% 21.1% 31.6% 31.6% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 2 3 1 8 5 19 
10.5% 15.8% 5.3% 42.1% 26.3% 100.0% 
53 Risk committee (or 
audit/board) explains how the 
identified financial risks will be 
addressed. [Par. 31-34, 40, 
41-43] 
2013 2 8 6 3 0 19 
10.5% 42.1% 31.6% 15.8% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 1 3 9 5 1 19 
5.3% 15.8% 47.4% 26.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 2 2 2 9 4 19 
10.5% 10.5% 10.5% 47.4% 21.1% 100.0% 
54 Risk committee (or 
audit/board) explains how the 
identified non-financial risks 
will be addressed. [Par. 31-
34, 41-43] 
2013 4 8 4 3 0 19 
21.1% 42.1% 21.1% 15.8% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 3 1 8 6 1 19 
15.8% 5.3% 42.1% 31.6% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 2 3 1 9 4 19 
10.5% 15.8% 5.3% 47.4% 21.1% 100.0% 
55 Risk committee (or 
audit/board) sets levels of risk 
tolerance. [Principle 4.2, Par. 
11-15] 
2013 5 9 3 1 1 19 
26.3% 47.4% 15.8% 5.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 3 4 8 2 2 19 
15.8% 21.1% 42.1% 10.5% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 2 4 6 5 2 19 
10.5% 21.1% 31.6% 26.3% 10.5% 100.0% 
56 Risk committee (or 
audit/board) expresses its 
views on the effectiveness of 
the company’s risk 
management processes. [Par. 
4] 
2013 7 6 5 0 1 19 
36.8% 31.6% 26.3% 0.0% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 3 4 9 1 2 19 
15.8% 21.1% 47.4% 5.3% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 2 7 3 4 3 19 
10.5% 36.8% 15.8% 21.1% 15.8% 100.0% 
57 Remuneration committee 2013 2 1 3 4 9 19 
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comprises at least 2 non-
executive and independent 
directors. [Researchers own 
indicator] 
10.5% 5.3% 15.8% 21.1% 47.4% 100.0% 
2014 2 0 5 3 9 19 
10.5% 0.0% 26.3% 15.8% 47.4% 100.0% 
2015 1 0 1 5 12 19 
5.3% 0.0% 5.3% 26.3% 63.2% 100.0% 
58 It is chaired by an 
independent non-executive 
director, other than the 
chairman of the Board or 
executive director. [Par 
2013 5 2 2 4 6 19 
26.3% 10.5% 10.5% 21.1% 31.6% 100.0% 
2014 5 2 1 4 7 19 
26.3% 10.5% 5.3% 21.1% 36.8% 100.0% 
2015 5 2 1 3 8 19 
26.3% 10.5% 5.3% 15.8% 42.1% 100.0% 
59 Formal charter and processes 
are in place outlining the 
functions of the remuneration 
committee. [Par. 
125,126&134 of Bo 
2013 5 7 5 1 1 19 
26.3% 36.8% 26.3% 5.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 4 6 4 3 2 19 
21.1% 31.6% 21.1% 15.8% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 2 5 6 3 3 19 
10.5% 26.3% 31.6% 15.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
60 Remuneration committee 
meets at least 2 times a year 
(not required by King III but 
considered necessary for the 
purposes 
2013 2 0 0 2 15 19 
10.5% 0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 78.9% 100.0% 
2014 2 0 0 1 16 19 
10.5% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 84.2% 100.0% 
2015 2 0 0 1 16 19 
10.5% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 84.2% 100.0% 
61 Remuneration committee or 
other structure determines 
remuneration of executive 
and Non-executive directors. 
[Par. 150 of 
2013 5 6 2 4 2 19 
26.3% 31.6% 10.5% 21.1% 10.5% 100.0% 
2014 4 2 6 4 3 19 
21.1% 10.5% 31.6% 21.1% 15.8% 100.0% 
2015 4 1 4 5 5 19 
21.1% 5.3% 21.1% 26.3% 26.3% 100.0% 
62 It is chaired by an 
independent non-executive 
director, who can also be the 
chairman of 
the Board, other than the 
executive director. [Par. 131 
of Boards & Directors] 
2013 8 2 3 2 4 19 
42.1% 10.5% 15.8% 10.5% 21.1% 100.0% 
2014 8 1 3 2 5 19 
42.1% 5.3% 15.8% 10.5% 26.3% 100.0% 
2015 8 1 3 1 6 19 
42.1% 5.3% 15.8% 5.3% 31.6% 100.0% 
63 Directors nominated by the 
committee or other structure 
are presented for approval by 
the shareholders. [Par. 80 of 
Boar 
2013 5 6 5 2 1 19 
26.3% 31.6% 26.3% 10.5% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 5 5 1 5 3 19 
26.3% 26.3% 5.3% 26.3% 15.8% 100.0% 
2015 4 3 2 7 3 19 
21.1% 15.8% 10.5% 36.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
64 Internal audit function has 
been set up (within the 
company or externally). [Par. 
1] 
2013 0 0 2 0 17 19 
0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 0.0% 89.5% 100.0% 
2014 0 0 0 0 19 19 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2015 0 0 0 0 19 19 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
65 Internal audit function reports 
to the audit committee. [Par. 
24, 33] 
2013 4 1 1 0 13 19 
21.1% 5.3% 5.3% 0.0% 68.4% 100.0% 
2014 4 1 0 1 13 19 
21.1% 5.3% 0.0% 5.3% 68.4% 100.0% 
2015 2 0 0 1 16 19 
10.5% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 84.2% 100.0% 
66 Internal audit is headed by the 
chief audit executive (CAE) or 
external company. [Par. 11] 
2013 12 1 2 0 4 19 
63.2% 5.3% 10.5% 0.0% 21.1% 100.0% 
2014 9 2 1 1 6 19 
47.4% 10.5% 5.3% 5.3% 31.6% 100.0% 
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2015 8 2 1 1 7 19 
42.1% 10.5% 5.3% 5.3% 36.8% 100.0% 
67 Internal audit (or its CAE) / 
external company attends 
audit committee meetings, 
board meetings by invitation. 
[Par. 28, 
2013 12 0 1 0 6 19 
63.2% 0.0% 5.3% 0.0% 31.6% 100.0% 
2014 9 1 4 1 4 19 
47.4% 5.3% 21.1% 5.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
2015 9 2 2 0 6 19 
47.4% 10.5% 10.5% 0.0% 31.6% 100.0% 
68 Internal audit/other structure 
provides assurance on the 
effectiveness of internal 
control environment. 
[Principle 7.3, 
2013 0 8 4 6 1 19 
0.0% 42.1% 21.1% 31.6% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 0 4 7 5 3 19 
0.0% 21.1% 36.8% 26.3% 15.8% 100.0% 
2015 0 5 8 4 2 19 
0.0% 26.3% 42.1% 21.1% 10.5% 100.0% 
69 Internal audit/other structure 
provides assurance on the 
effectiveness of risk 
management. [Principle 7.3, 
Par. 2, 12-17 
2013 0 11 2 5 1 19 
0.0% 57.9% 10.5% 26.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 0 8 5 3 3 19 
0.0% 42.1% 26.3% 15.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
2015 1 7 5 3 3 19 
5.3% 36.8% 26.3% 15.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
70 Internal audit/other structure 
provides assurance on the 
effectiveness of governance 
(including ethics). [Par. 2] 
2013 1 12 1 4 1 19 
5.3% 63.2% 5.3% 21.1% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 0 9 5 3 2 19 
0.0% 47.4% 26.3% 15.8% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 1 9 6 2 1 19 
5.3% 47.4% 31.6% 10.5% 5.3% 100.0% 
71 Internal audit is subjected to 
an independent quality 
review. [Par. 23] 
2013 9 2 2 1 5 19 
47.4% 10.5% 10.5% 5.3% 26.3% 100.0% 
2014 8 3 1 3 4 19 
42.1% 15.8% 5.3% 15.8% 21.1% 100.0% 
2015 8 0 0 3 8 19 
42.1% 0.0% 0.0% 15.8% 42.1% 100.0% 
72  Internal audit follows a risk-
based approach to its plan. 
[Principle 7.2, Par. 7, 18] 
2013 4 6 6 3 0 19 
21.1% 31.6% 31.6% 15.8% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 2 5 8 2 2 19 
10.5% 26.3% 42.1% 10.5% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 4 5 5 3 2 19 
21.1% 26.3% 26.3% 15.8% 10.5% 100.0% 
73 Board or other structure 
monitors and evaluates 
significant IT investments and 
expenditure. [Principle 5.4] 
2013 7 10 1 1 0 19 
36.8% 52.6% 5.3% 5.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 6 7 4 1 1 19 
31.6% 36.8% 21.1% 5.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 8 3 4 2 2 19 
42.1% 15.8% 21.1% 10.5% 10.5% 100.0% 
74 A suitably qualified and 
experienced chief information 
officer (CIO) is appointed to 
manage IT. [Par. 20] 
2013 18 1 0 0 0 19 
94.7% 5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 15 0 2 1 1 19 
78.9% 0.0% 10.5% 5.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 12 0 0 2 5 19 
63.2% 0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 26.3% 100.0% 
75 Board or other structure 
ensures that IT complies with 
IT related laws, rules, codes 
and standards. [Par. 33] 
2013 12 5 1 1 0 19 
63.2% 26.3% 5.3% 5.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 13 2 3 0 1 19 
68.4% 10.5% 15.8% 0.0% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 8 3 4 1 3 19 
42.1% 15.8% 21.1% 5.3% 15.8% 100.0% 
76 Risk committee or other 
structure oversees overall risk 
2013 9 8 1 1 0 19 
47.4% 42.1% 5.3% 5.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
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implications of IT. [Par. 30-34; 
43-47] 
2014 7 5 5 2 0 19 
36.8% 26.3% 26.3% 10.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 2 5 7 1 4 19 
10.5% 26.3% 36.8% 5.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
77 Audit committee or other 
structure oversees financial 
risk implications of IT. [Par. 
47] 
2013 11 7 1 0 0 19 
57.9% 36.8% 5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 8 7 3 1 0 19 
42.1% 36.8% 15.8% 5.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 3 7 6 0 3 19 
15.8% 36.8% 31.6% 0.0% 15.8% 100.0% 
78 Board receives an 
independent assurance on 
the effectiveness of IT 
through internal 
audit function and/or external 
assurance providers. [Par. 28] 
2013 16 1 2 0 0 19 
84.2% 5.3% 10.5% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 14 1 3 1 0 19 
73.7% 5.3% 15.8% 5.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 10 2 2 1 4 19 
52.6% 10.5% 10.5% 5.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
79 Compliance function has 
been set up by the company. 
[Par. 16] 
2013 3 6 3 3 4 19 
15.8% 31.6% 15.8% 15.8% 21.1% 100.0% 
2014 2 3 4 2 8 19 
10.5% 15.8% 21.1% 10.5% 42.1% 100.0% 
2015 1 3 3 3 9 19 
5.3% 15.8% 15.8% 15.8% 47.4% 100.0% 
80 Compliance function/other 
structure oversees 
compliance with laws, rules, 
codes and standards. 
[Principle 6.1] 
2013 1 5 7 1 5 19 
5.3% 26.3% 36.8% 5.3% 26.3% 100.0% 
2014 0 2 6 6 5 19 
0.0% 10.5% 31.6% 31.6% 26.3% 100.0% 
2015 1 0 6 4 8 19 
5.3% 0.0% 31.6% 21.1% 42.1% 100.0% 
81 Company discloses non-
binding rules, codes and 
standards to which it adheres. 
[Par. 6] 
2013 6 8 2 2 1 19 
31.6% 42.1% 10.5% 10.5% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 6 3 6 1 3 19 
31.6% 15.8% 31.6% 5.3% 15.8% 100.0% 
2015 2 5 4 2 6 19 
10.5% 26.3% 21.1% 10.5% 31.6% 100.0% 
82  Board identifies key 
stakeholders and their 
interests on a regular basis. 
[Par. 7, 8 of King III] 
2013 9 2 4 4 0 19 
47.4% 10.5% 21.1% 21.1% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 4 4 3 6 2 19 
21.1% 21.1% 15.8% 31.6% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 1 4 5 5 4 19 
5.3% 21.1% 26.3% 26.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
83 Interests of key stakeholders 
are taken into account in the 
integrated report. [Par. 7, 9 of 
King III] 
2013 5 7 2 5 0 19 
26.3% 36.8% 10.5% 26.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 3 3 5 5 3 19 
15.8% 15.8% 26.3% 26.3% 15.8% 100.0% 
2015 2 2 6 4 5 19 
10.5% 10.5% 31.6% 21.1% 26.3% 100.0% 
84  Financial and sustainability 
issues on economic, social 
and environmental all covered 
in one or more documents of 
integr 
2013 4 7 6 1 1 19 
21.1% 36.8% 31.6% 5.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 0 9 4 3 3 19 
0.0% 47.4% 21.1% 15.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
2015 0 8 4 5 2 19 
0.0% 42.1% 21.1% 26.3% 10.5% 100.0% 
85 Information in the integrated 
report is connected showing 
interdependencies between 
factors that create value over 
time 
2013 12 5 2 0 0 19 
63.2% 26.3% 10.5% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 6 7 4 2 0 19 
31.6% 36.8% 21.1% 10.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 3 9 3 3 1 19 
15.8% 47.4% 15.8% 15.8% 5.3% 100.0% 
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86 The integrated report provides 
insight into the nature and 
quality of the organizations 
relationships with its key 
stake 
2013 8 3 6 2 0 19 
42.1% 15.8% 31.6% 10.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 2 5 8 4 0 19 
10.5% 26.3% 42.1% 21.1% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 3 3 5 5 3 19 
15.8% 15.8% 26.3% 26.3% 15.8% 100.0% 
87  The integrated report is 
concise (IR3.36) 
2013 6 9 3 1 0 19 
31.6% 47.4% 15.8% 5.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 2 7 8 2 0 19 
10.5% 36.8% 42.1% 10.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 1 4 6 7 1 19 
5.3% 21.1% 31.6% 36.8% 5.3% 100.0% 
88 The integrated report provides 
both positive and negative 
information in a balanced way 
(IR 3.39) 
2013 1 5 8 3 2 19 
5.3% 26.3% 42.1% 15.8% 10.5% 100.0% 
2014 0 1 12 5 1 19 
0.0% 5.3% 63.2% 26.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 0 1 10 4 4 19 
0.0% 5.3% 52.6% 21.1% 21.1% 100.0% 
89 The integrated report is 
comparable between 
organizations and consistent 
over time (IR 3.54) 
2013 0 7 10 2 0 19 
0.0% 36.8% 52.6% 10.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 0 4 13 2 0 19 
0.0% 21.1% 68.4% 10.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 0 6 9 3 1 19 
0.0% 31.6% 47.4% 15.8% 5.3% 100.0% 
90 Integrated report identifies 
organizations mission and 
vision and identifies essential 
context of the entity (IR 4.5) 
2013 4 0 1 2 12 19 
21.1% 0.0% 5.3% 10.5% 63.2% 100.0% 
2014 1 0 0 2 16 19 
5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 84.2% 100.0% 
2015 1 0 0 1 17 19 
5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 89.5% 100.0% 
91 Identifies the entities culture, 
ownership structure and 
competitive landscape (IR 
4.5) 
2013 6 5 2 3 3 19 
31.6% 26.3% 10.5% 15.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
2014 0 7 3 2 7 19 
0.0% 36.8% 15.8% 10.5% 36.8% 100.0% 
2015 1 4 2 3 9 19 
5.3% 21.1% 10.5% 15.8% 47.4% 100.0% 
92 The integrated report  
identifies significant factors 
affecting the external 
environment include aspects 
of the legal, commercial, 
social, environmental and 
political context that affect the 
organization’s ability to create 
value in the short, medium or 
long term. (IR 4.6) 
2013 2 8 6 1 2 19 
10.5% 42.1% 31.6% 5.3% 10.5% 100.0% 
2014 0 4 10 3 2 19 
0.0% 21.1% 52.6% 15.8% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 0 5 7 5 2 19 
0.0% 26.3% 36.8% 26.3% 10.5% 100.0% 
93 93 The Integrated reports sets 
out how the organizations 
governance structure support 
its ability to create value in the 
sh 
2013 9 7 2 1 0 19 
47.4% 36.8% 10.5% 5.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 4 7 5 3 0 19 
21.1% 36.8% 26.3% 15.8% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 3 5 6 4 1 19 
15.8% 26.3% 31.6% 21.1% 5.3% 100.0% 
94  The integrated report 
describes the entiys business 
model (IR 4.12) 
2013 5 7 3 4 0 19 
26.3% 36.8% 15.8% 21.1% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 3 3 8 3 2 19 
15.8% 15.8% 42.1% 15.8% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 3 2 4 7 3 19 
15.8% 10.5% 21.1% 36.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
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95 The integrated report shows 
how key inputs relate to the 
capitals on which the 
organization depends on and 
is material to understanding 
the business model (IR  4.1.4) 
2013 15 1 1 2 0 19 
78.9% 5.3% 5.3% 10.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 13 3 1 1 1 19 
68.4% 15.8% 5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 11 2 0 1 5 19 
57.9% 10.5% 0.0% 5.3% 26.3% 100.0% 
96 The integrated report 
describes key business 
activities (IR4.16) 
2013 0 10 7 1 1 19 
0.0% 52.6% 36.8% 5.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 0 6 8 3 2 19 
0.0% 31.6% 42.1% 15.8% 10.5% 100.0% 
2015 0 5 6 3 5 19 
0.0% 26.3% 31.6% 15.8% 26.3% 100.0% 
97 The integrated report 
identifies an organizations key 
products and services 
(IR4.18) 
2013 3 4 6 5 1 19 
15.8% 21.1% 31.6% 26.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 0 6 9 1 3 19 
0.0% 31.6% 47.4% 5.3% 15.8% 100.0% 
2015 0 5 8 3 3 19 
0.0% 26.3% 42.1% 15.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
98 The integrated report 
identifies key outcomes of the 
business model (IR 4.19) 
2013 2 5 7 5 0 19 
10.5% 26.3% 36.8% 26.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 0 7 6 5 1 19 
0.0% 36.8% 31.6% 26.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 1 5 3 6 4 19 
5.3% 26.3% 15.8% 31.6% 21.1% 100.0% 
99 An integrated report identifies 
the key risks and 
opportunities that are specific 
to the organization, including 
those that relate to the 
organization’s effects on, and 
the continued availability, 
quality and affordability of, 
relevant capitals in the short, 
medium and long term. 
(IR4.24) 
2013 7 5 1 5 1 19 
36.8% 26.3% 5.3% 26.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 3 4 5 4 3 19 
15.8% 21.1% 26.3% 21.1% 15.8% 100.0% 
2015 3 2 2 3 9 19 
15.8% 10.5% 10.5% 15.8% 47.4% 100.0% 
100 The integrated report 
identifies where the 
organisation wants to go and 
how it tends to get there 
including a description of the 
linkage between the 
organization’s strategy and 
resource allocation (IR4.27-
4.29) 
2013 1 9 8 1 0 19 
5.3% 47.4% 42.1% 5.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 0 3 7 8 1 19 
0.0% 15.8% 36.8% 42.1% 5.3% 100.0% 
2015 0 3 4 7 5 19 
0.0% 15.8% 21.1% 36.8% 26.3% 100.0% 
101 The integrated report contains 
qualitative and quantitative 
information about 
performance pertaining to 
whether the entity has 
achieved its strategic 
objectives and the outcomes 
effect on capitals (IR4.31) 
2013 0 4 10 4 1 19 
0.0% 21.1% 52.6% 21.1% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 0 0 9 6 4 19 
0.0% 0.0% 47.4% 31.6% 21.1% 100.0% 
2015 0 0 5 6 8 19 
0.0% 0.0% 26.3% 31.6% 42.1% 100.0% 
102 KPIs combine financial 
measures with other 
measures (IR4.32) 
2013 4 3 5 4 3 19 
21.1% 15.8% 26.3% 21.1% 15.8% 100.0% 
2014 1 2 6 4 6 19 
5.3% 10.5% 31.6% 21.1% 31.6% 100.0% 
2015 0 1 7 4 7 19 
0.0% 5.3% 36.8% 21.1% 36.8% 100.0% 
103 The integrated report 2013 4 10 2 3 0 19 
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identifies what challenges and 
uncertainties is the 
organization likely to 
encounter in pursuing its 
strategy, and what are the 
potential implications for its 
business model and future 
performance (IR4.34) 
21.1% 52.6% 10.5% 15.8% 0.0% 100.0% 
2014 2 5 8 4 0 19 
10.5% 26.3% 42.1% 21.1% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 3 3 4 4 5 19 
15.8% 15.8% 21.1% 21.1% 26.3% 100.0% 
104 The integrated report provides 
lead indicators, KPIs or 
objectives (IR 4.38) 
2013 13 3 1 0 2 19 
68.4% 15.8% 5.3% 0.0% 10.5% 100.0% 
2014 7 8 4 0 0 19 
36.8% 42.1% 21.1% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 8 5 3 1 2 19 
42.1% 26.3% 15.8% 5.3% 10.5% 100.0% 
105 The How does the 
organization determine what 
matters to include in the 
integrated report and how are 
such matters quantified or 
evaluated (IR4.40) 
2013 16 2 0 0 1 19 
84.2% 10.5% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 100.0% 
2014 14 3 0 2 0 19 
73.7% 15.8% 0.0% 10.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
2015 11 3 0 3 2 19 
57.9% 15.8% 0.0% 15.8% 10.5% 100.0% 
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